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"MEDICAL ADVERSITY INSURANCE"-
HAS ITS TIME COME?
CLARK C. HAVIGHuRST*
In 1972, prior to the onset of the recent crisis in medical malprac-
tice insurance and the resulting widespread reappraisal of patients' le-
gal rights and malpractice remedies, this writer participated in the
formulation of a blueprint for "medical adversity insurance" (MAI),
which was published as "a no-fault approach to medical malpractice
and quality assurance."'- The MAI proposal was not a finished prod-
uct, however, and it was not ready for serious legislative or professional
consideration when the current problems arose and made the field sud-
denly fertile for substantive and procedural change. Indeed, it was
presented less as a proposal for immediate adoption than as a theoreti-
cally sound model for further study and as a conceptual benchmark for
evaluating both the fault system and existing quality-assurance mech-
anisms. Now, however, MAI has been given enough additional sub-
stance to qualify it for policy makers' attention.
The original MAI proposal was highly specific about the schemes
mechanics but sketchy about the coverage of the no-fault insurance
which it contemplated that providers would purchase for the ben-
efit of their patients. The emphasis on mechanical details in the origi-
nal presentation no doubt obscured the essentials of the MAI idea,
namely (1) advance specification of a limited list of automatically com-
pensable events, carefully drawn up by medical experts under some
form of public supervision, and (2) design of the insurance scheme
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to keep providers in some measure financially accountable for the re-
sults of treatment in order to preserve and strengthen their incentives
to avoid medical accidents and obtain better medical results. This
Article concentrates on these essentials, attempting to be more specific
about MAIs coverage, without reiterating or debating the compensa-
tion scheme's details.2 It also attempts to place the MAI proposal in
the perspective of the on-going debate concerning the law of medical
malpractice and the quality of medical care.3
I. THE FAULT SYSTEM DISCREDITED
A. The Standard Arguments Against the Fault System
The arguments for scrapping the fault system as the vehicle for
dealing with medical injuries are quite persuasive. Indeed, even the
conventional wisdom bears scrutiny rather well. The most frequently
noted adverse consequences of the system as it is currently structured
and administered may be listed as follows:
(1) the very high legal and administrative costs involved in claims
processing and fault-finding;4
(2) the psychic and time costs to physicians occasioned by charges
of professional negligence and by the litigation process used to
evaluate such charges;
2. Under the original proposal, no-fault insurance would indemnify all medical ex-
penses and all wage losses, subject to a minimum and maximum per week. Id. at 128,
71-72. It was suggested that some allowance might be made for severe pain and suffer-
ing on the basis of a formula rather than attempting to individualize such damages or
ignoring them altogether. Id. at 128-29, 72. (On the proposed treatment of collateral
sources, see text accompanying notes 110-12 infra.) Discovery of claims would be as-
sured by requiring providers, as a condition of relief from malpractice claims, to disclose
the existence of claims against an MA! fund. Id. at 130, 73. Although it was suggested
that policies not be cancellable, id. at 131, 74, it now seems unnecessary to make this
an explicit requirement. Subrogation of the insurer to claims against such third parties
as drug manufacturers and blood banks was contemplated as a means of strengthening
the incentives of other actors in the system. Id. at 141, 81.
3. Any advocate of policy change cannot be altogether comfortable when his argu-
ment is based almost exclusively on theory. Yet the potential complexity of MA! is
such that only physicians can translate the concept into practical terms and prepare the
plan for definitive assessment. Thus, this Article can only stress the rather powerful
logic behind MAI and urge intensive investigation of its practical merit. Most impor-
tantly, it argues for evaluation of MA on its own terms rather than under some other
premise, and much of the discussion is devoted to examining the premises of participants
in the malpractice/quality-of-care debate.
. 4. See Steves, A Proposal to Improve the Cost to Benefit Relationships in the Med-
ical Professional Liability Insurance System, 1975 Dun LJ. 1305.
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(3) the antagonisms unleashed, not only between doctors and pa-
tients but also between doctors and lawyers-or, more impor-
tantly, between doctors and the law itself, which physicians find
arbitrary, incapable of drawing realistic distinctions, and re-
sponsive only to emotion and the crasser human instincts;
(4) "defensive" medical practice, defined as either (a) the use of
diagnostic and other resources primarily for the purpose of
protecting the physician against a successful malpractice claim
rather than the patient against an adverse medical result or
(b) the refusal to provide needed care or to adopt desirable
new methods out of a concern that exposure to liability would be
increased;5 and
(5) the haphazard incidence of claims, which seem, like lightning,
to strike largely at random,' suggesting that (a) many injuries
go uncompensated, (b) a vast amount of negligence goes un-
policed, and (c) due process and the established legal merit of
a malpractice claim are insufficient guarantees, in view of the
system's failure -to treat all like things similarly, of the fairness
of a judgment against an individual provider.
7
Any benefits of the fault system which could offset the foregoing
disadvantages must be found in improvements in the quality of care
that are stimulated by provider apprehensions about potential claims
and liability. But, even if potential tort liability does perform a sub-
stantial quality-assurance function in the health care system," the costs
5. See, e.g., Bernzweig, Defensive Medicine, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT Ap-
pendix 38; Hershey, The Defensive Practice of Medicine, Myth or Reality?, 50 MILBANK
MEmORIAL FuND Q. 69 (1972); Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of
Defensive Medicine, 1971 DuKE U.. 939-48; Address by Potchen, Twine & Roberts, A
Dynamic Systems Analysis of Defensive Medicine, Medical Malpractice Crisis Confer-
ence (U. of Md. School of Law, Nov. 21-22, 1975).
6. See MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 23; Peterson, Consumers' Knowledge of and
Attitudes Toward Medical Malpractice, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT Appendix
658, 665-93 (survey indicated many people had had "negative medical care experiences"
without pursuing legal remedies); Brook, Brutoco & Williams, The Relationship Between
Medical Malpractice and Quality of Care, 1975 DUKE LJ. 1197.
7. Physicians are particularly disturbed that claims appear to be occasioned less by
variations in the technical quality of the care received than by such factors as the pa-
tient's personality and circumstances, the doctor's "bedside manner," the lawyer's interest
in the claim, and chance disclosure of the existence of actionable negligence. See also
text accompanying note 13 infra. The unscientific character of both the fact-finding
process and the means of establishing the legal standard of care also contribute to per-
ceptions of unfairness. See, e.g., Child, Lawyers, Doctors and Medical Malpractice: A
Surgeon Reacts, in MICAL MALPRACmCE 43 (Shapiro, Steingold & Needham eds.
1965).
8. There is substantial doubt about whether the hazard of malpractice claims con-
1235
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1975:1233
of the current system's dysfunctional aspects are still so great as to com-
pel attention to the possibility that the objectives sought could be
achieved more cheaply or more effectively by other means.
The legislative deliberations precipitated by the recent malprac-
tice crisis have not focused extensively on the possibility of a new de-
parture.9 Instead, the legislatures have been primarily concerned with
shoring up the fault system, the insurance component of which was rap-
idly breaking down.10 In attempting to make insurable a set of risks
which was becoming uninsurable, policy makers initially confined
-themselves to addressing the current system's defects, and only recently
has attention been directed to the possibility of eliminating or de-em-
phasizing the fault factor in compensating for injuries." As one pro-
posal for doing this, the MAI scheme also calls attention to the need
either to maintain and perhaps strengthen the quality-assurance func-
tion of the injury-compensation system or to replace it with something
at least equally effective. The MAI proposal should be helpful to ob-
tributes to improving the quality of care. See Brook, Brutoco & Williams, supra note
6, at 1220; Ball, PSRO, Malpractice Litigation, and Defensive Medicine, Medical Mal-
practice Crisis Conference (U. of Md. School of Law, Nov. 21-22, 1975). The possibil-
ity remains, however, that doctors' responses to the malpractice threat, including the
phenomenon of defensive medicine, see text accompanying note 5 supra, contribute to
better technical care than would be obtained if there were no sanctions for poor-quality
care other than professional sanctions.
Another type of qualitative benefit may flow from physicians' perception that law-
suits are less likely to be initiated if the patient has not been personally offended during
treatment. See Pabst, Comments on Medical Opinion Survey of Physicians' Attitudes
on Medical Malpractice, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT Appendix 83, 84 (citing
"poor communications" as the chief cause of the malpractice problem); Mechanic, Some
Social Aspects of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma, 1975 DUKn L.J. 1179; Peterson, su-
pra note 6. This may lead the physician to be more respectful of the patient's feelings,
cultivating "bedside manner" as a means of avoiding lawsuits. Consumer groups and oth-
ers have been hesitant to see patients' malpractice rights curtailed because of the lack of
other means of holding providers accountable for the care provided. E.g., Wolfe, The
Real Victim, TRIAL 26 (May/June 1975) ("Thus far, unfortunately, malpractice litiga-
tion has clearly been the only form of protest in which the consumer has had any rea-
sonable chance at redress for grievances."). See also Thompson, Lupton & Feldesman,
Patient Grievance Mechanisms in Health Care Institutions, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
REPORT Appendix 758. On MAI's impact on this problem, see note 49 infra.
9. While radical, the Kennedy-Inouye no-fault bill, S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975), was offered primarily for discussion purposes. See text accompanying notes
31-33 infra.
10. See Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Mal-
practice Crisis, 1975 Dunn L.J. 1417.
11. These possibilities have been actively considered by the following, among oth-
ers: National Conference on Medical Malpractice; Conference on the Medical Malprac-
tice Crisis (U. of Md. School of Law, Nov. 21-22, 1975); ABA Commission on Medical
Professional Liability; American Insurance Association All Industry Committee; and
New York Special Advisory Panel on Medical Malpractice. See also note 9 supra.
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servers in identifying both the theoretical issues and the practical prob-
lems in designing acceptable compensation and quality-assurance
mechanisms.
B. Outcome Assessment Versus Process Standards
The MAI scheme also points up some additional arguments, more
fundamental than the foregoing pragmatic ones, which can be ad-
vanced against continued reliance on the fault system. Thus, it reflects
the attention which reformers in the health field have recently focused
on the advantages of assessing the quality of medical care on the basis
of actual outcomes-that is, in terms of resulting patient health-rather
than on the basis of "process"-that is, the individual steps actually
taken in treating the patient. 12  Although malpractice claims occur only
where there has been a bad outcome, the fault system is in no other
respect outcome-oriented. For one thing, only a very small proportion
of unsatisfactory outcomes produce claims, and fortuitous factors-for
example, doctor or patient personality traits, the degree to which the
patient's hardship is mitigated by collateral sources of financial protec-
tion, and the patient's possible ignorance that negligence rather than
bad luck accounted for his injury-are perhaps more important de-
terminants of claims initiation than a bad outcome itself.' 3 A bad out-
come is therefore by no means a sufficient condition for a malpractice
lawsuit, though it is obviously a necessary one. It may nevertheless
still be true that the malpractice suit is the only appreciable external
check on the quality of outcomes currently operating in the health care
system.'
4
12. See, e.g., A. CocHRANE, EFFECTVENESS AN EFFIcNcY-RANDOM REFLEC-
TIONS ON HEALTH SERVICES (1972); P. ELLWOOD, P. O'DONOGHUE, W. McCLuRn et al.,
AsSURiNG THE QuALrry OF HEALTH CAR (1973); Williamson, Outcomes of Health
Care: Key to Health Improvement, in METHODOLOGY OF IDENTIFING, MEASURING AND
EVALUATING OUTCOMES OF HEALTH SERVICE PROGRAMS, SYSTEMS, AND SUBSYSTEMS 75
(C. Hopkins ed. 1970); Brook & Appel, Quality of Care Assessment: Choosing a
Method for Peer Review, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1323 (1973); Ball, supra note 8, at
11-16.
13. See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text.
14. See Carlson, Health Manpower Licensing and Emerging Institutional Responsi-
bility for the Quality of Care, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 848, 859-62 (1970). Carlson,
however, appears to regard malpractice claims as more of a check on outcomes than they
are in fact, and neglects to classify hospital tissue review committees as another out-
come-oriented control. More recently, Professional Standards Review Organizations
(PSROs) have been formed for the purpose of regulating the quality of care with some
expectation that they will engage in outcome assessment and studies of cost-effectiveness.
42 U.S.C. § 1320c (Supp. I1, 1973). See Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping With
Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 6
(1975); Ball, supra note 8, at 38.
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The legal standard of care employed under the fault system to
judge provider negligence tends to focus attention on process rather
than on outcome. Because liability is seldom automatic,15 but depends
on a showing that the doctor departed from accepted practice or omit-
ted some customary diagnostic or therapeutic measure, physicians are
compelled to do what other doctors do, and they depart from common
practice only at their peril.16 Certain kinds of "defensive" medicine
reflect the effort of many physicians to reduce their legal exposure by
erring on the side of doing too much rather than too little; their ex-
cesses may aid not at all in the patient's physical recovery but are in-
stead intended solely to forestall his financial recovery in the event of
an unsatisfactory result. Although physicians also frequently complain
of the hazard of "cookbook" medicine under process-oriented regula-
tory controls, 1 the process standards enforced by the fault system are
even more pernicious, since they do not make clear where the physi-
cian may safely stop and seem to require that everything possible be
done. Moreover, because the fault system is administered by lawyers,
judges, juries, and partisan experts, all exercising hindsight, physicians
have no confidence that realistic standards will in fact be applied. They
therefore operate on the worst-case hypothesis and protect themselves
as best they can. There is surely a warrant for those reform proposals
which would alter administrative arrangements under the present sys-
tem to improve fault-finding processes,' thereby strengthening doc-
tors' confidence that their conscientious efforts will not be penalized
unless demonstrably deficient by reasonable standards.
15. See generally Louisell & Williams, Res Ipsa Loquitur-Its Future in Medical
Malpractice Cases, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 252 (1960); McCoid, The Care Required of Medi-
cal Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REv. 549, 605-32 (1959).
16. See 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 8.04-.06 (1973);
McCoid, supra note 15, at 558-75, 581-85. The doctrine that adherence to custom in
medical practice constitutes due care has long been buttressed by the maxim that a prac-
titioner "experiments at his peril" with unusual methods. Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb.
488 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871), rev'd on other grounds, 50 N.Y. 696 (1872); Slater v. Baker,
95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767). Such "experimentation" is of course justified if an inno-
vative treatment offers the patient's best hope and informed consent is obtained. A.
HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAw 102-03, 249-54 (1975). More broadly, noncusto-
mary practices may be approved if they are the chosen methods of a legitimate "school
of practice" or of a "respectable" or "reputable" minority of practitioners. Id. at 44-
45; 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WLLIAMS, supra, f 8.04; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS 163 (4th ed. 1971); Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care:
HMOs and Customary Practice, 1975 DuKE L.J 1375; McCoid, supra note 15, at 565.
17. E.g., Frederick, "Cookbook Medicine": A New Tome Stirs Debate, MED.
WORLD NEvs, July 28, 1975, at 61, discussing AMA, MODEL SCREENING CRIrERiA TO
ASSIST PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS R.vsnw ORGANmZATIONS (1975); AMA Urges Medical
Injury Compensation, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 13, 1975, at 1.
18. See Comment, State Legislative Responses, supra note 10,
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But, even if the fault system could be substantially improved, per-
haps by employing arbitration or screening panels in the assessment of
claims, only a few of the foregoing concerns would have been ad-
dressed, and none would have been fully resolved. Moreover, there
would remain a strong basis for doubt that the legal standard being ap-
plied was in fact the socially appropriate one. Although it may seem
paradoxical in light of a widely perceived need to improve the quality
of medical care in the United States, the standard of care employed
in malpractice suits, based as it is on customary processes and not on
outcomes, is probably too high in many respects.19 Professional stand-
ards, lacking scientific evidence of efficacy and cost-effectiveness, dic-
tate many substantial expenditures which return little benefit and may
on some occasions increase hazards."0 It is a chronic problem in health
care that many physicians' decisions taken in the name of the quality
of care fail to advance that object either at all or enough to justify the
costs entailed, thereby wasting societal resources and perhaps diverting
them from more pressing health care needs.2 '
In nonmedical settings, the use of prevailing custom as a guide
in assessing negligence is justifed if that standard has been determined
by reasonably dependable market forces-that is, by buyers and sellers
making private decisions with respect to the desirability of added in-
crements of safety.22 Where a safety measure thus generally agreed
19. This is not to deny that bad care may sometimes be customary. In some juris-
dictions a perception of this state of affairs has led to a narrowing of the customary
practice doctrine, based upon Judge Learned Hand's reasoning in The T.J. Hooper, 60
F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). E.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33
Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Favalora v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 So. 2d 299 (La. App. 1962); Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d
206 (Pa. 1971); Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974). See Note,
Comparative Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.J. 1141,
1146-50 (1975). Although custom-set standards may be either too low or too high by
objective measures, this Article stresses mainly the excessive care which doctors may
seek to take when their decision-making lacks financial constraints. See Bovbjerg, supra
note 16, at 1396.
20. See, e.g., A. CocHmANE, supra note 12; U.S. PuBLIC HEALTH SERvIcE, FORWARD
PLAN FOR HEALTH FY 1977-81, at 144-61 (DHEW Pub. No. 05-76-50074, 1975); Neu-
hauser, The Future of Proprietaries in American Health Services, in REGULATING
HEALTH FAciLrrms CONSTRUCTION 233-37 (C. Havighurst ed. 1974).. These sources
supply exhaustive further references.
21. See notes 23-24 infra and accompanying text. See generally Havighurst &
Blumstein, supra note 14, at 9-20.
22. See Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUmS 29, 32-33 (1972). Al-
though consumer ignorance can frequently be advanced to counter the presumption in
favor of market-determined standards, this argument should not be too readily accepted,
particularly since markets cater not to the average customer but to the marginal one,
who is frequently better informed. Of course, custom would be an inappropriate guide
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upon by buyers and sellers has been omitted by a seller, the buyer's
right to sue supplies a useful opportunity to correct, after the fact, a
kind of market failure occasioned, it is presumed, by the buyer's ig-
norance. With respect to medical care, however, custom and practice
among practitioners may be a poor guide to appropriate safety-promot-
ing conduct because consumers make few purchasing decisions. Not
only are treatment decisions largely delegated to doctors, but, because
third parties pay most of the bills, cost is taken into account to only
a very limited extent; the physician's fiduciary responsibilities, which at
one time included a duty to look out for the patient's pocketbook, are
now largely directed to getting the maximum medical benefit for his
patient, regardless of the cost.23  Indeed, it is to a large extent the
availability of third-party payment which allows the physician to incur
the high costs involved in defensive medicine, which, by definition, is
undertaken more for the benefit of the provider than for the good of
the patient.24 In these circumstances, prevailing custom and practice,
even if that standard could be perfectly implemented in practice, would
be an inappropriate standard. Departure from the fault system and
its process-oriented standards would therefore be a positive step from
the standpoint of health policy in general. One of MAI's prime fea-
tures is its shift of emphasis from process to outcome.
C. From Fault to No-Fault
Because the fault system is dysfunctional in so many respects, al-
ternatives to it must be seriously considered. One alternative is of
course simply to repeal altogether the patient's right to sue a negligent
physician, and some substantial limitations on that right have recently
been imposed in some states in the form of (1) absolute dollar limits
on recoveries permitted2 5 and (2) revised statutes of limitations which
arbitrarily cut off claims for undiscovered injuries.28 Such piecemeal
for establishing duties toward individuals who were not parties to a contractual relation-
ship with the alleged tort-feasor. See id. at 36-38. On the admissibility of evidence
of custom, see generally Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Il. 2d
326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965); McCoid, supra note 15, at 558-75.
23. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 14, at 13-15, 25-30.
24. See Project, supra note 5, at 942, 946. It is worth observing that the MAI
scheme would not limit health care spending except insofar as unproductive defensive
medicine was obviated. See note 112 infra. Cost control would have to be achieved
by other means, since providers, under MA or otherwise, have little incentive to seek
the optimal level of spending. See notes 48 & 93 infra.
25. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 41-4103 (Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-9.5-2-2
(Bums Supp. 1975). See generally Comment, State Legislative Responses, supra note
10, at 1418-25.
26. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-9.5-
3-1. See generally Comment, State Legislative Responses, supra note 10, at 1429-36.
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repeals are troublesome in much the same sense that -wholesale repeal
of patients' tort remedies would be, but they have been tolerated pri-
marily out of a desire to maintain the insurability of physicians' liability
risks. Aside from measures couched in this expediency, however, re-
peal of the fault system without introduction of a substitute compensa-
tion mechanism has not been seriously proposed. Attention is there-
fore directed to "no-fault" compensation plans.
11. THE No-FAULT NOTION AS APPLIED TO MEDICAL CARE:
THE FUNCTION OF DETERRENCE
A. Compensation or Deterrence as the Goal?
The medical profession usually responds positively to proposals for
a no-fault compensation system for medically caused injuries to patients.
This response originates in large part in doctors' anticipation that a no-
fault scheme would relieve them not only of the psychic and other bur-
dens of malpractice claims and lawsuits but of financial responsibility
as well. Thus, in his statement dissenting from the 1973 Report of
the Health, Education and Welfare Secretary's Commission on Medical
Malpractice, Dr. Charles A. Hoffman, then president of the American
Medical Association (AMA), endorsed a compensation plan which
would require employers to insure their employees against medical in-
juries. 7 Such a plan contrasts sharply, however, with another type
of no-fault proposal, which would continue to require providers to bear
at least some of the accident costs arising out of the care they render
but would dispense with extensive factual inquiries and with fault-find-
ing in individual cases. An essential basis for distinguishing among
no-fault plans, therefore, is the extent to which the plan internalizes
costs by imposing them in some meaningful way on the providers re-
sponsible for the care or externalizes them by passing them on to the
public through government or some other third party unrelated to the
health care transaction.
How one feels the costs of medical injuries should be borne de-
pends largely on whether one focuses primarily on the need to com-
pensate the injured patient or also considers it important to motivate
providers to avoid compensable outcomes. Dr. Hoffman, stressing only
the urgency of compensation for the injured, notes that the "economic
need of patients injured in the course of their health care is just as great
27. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 113, 127-30 (C. Hoffman, dissenting state-
ment). See also Editorial, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 13, 1975, at 4.
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regardless of whether the injury was caused by malpractice or whether
it was an unavoidable risk inherent in the care." 28  But, because the
victims of medical accidents are in no way a needier class than persons
who are the victims of disease in general or of other types of accidents,
a no-fault medical compensation system caniot be recommended solely
on the ground that it would provide compensation for injuries which
are now uncompensated.
A better ground for preferring a no-fault scheme is that it is a
way of eliminating the problems caused by the existing system while
not denying compensation to those who qualify for it now. Indeed,
Dr. Hoffman's plan to compensate for medical injuries (including un-
avoidable events attending recognized risks)-while ignoring for com-
pensation purposes other accidental injuries as well as the disease which
brought the patient into the health care system in the first place-can
best be defended not as a benefit to patients but as a means of totally
eradicating the malfunctioning system of malpractice litigation. Many
observers would be reluctant, however, to see problems generated by
the law of medical malpractice "solved" by exonerating the negligent
physician and eliminating altogether whatever incentives for better-
quality care tort law may introduce. Attention is thus focused on com-
pensation systems which, while removing malpractice cases from the
courts and avoiding extensive fault-finding, could nevertheless preserve
or strengthen the system's quality-enhancing incentives.
The MAI scheme reflects a strong preference for maintaining the
tort system's function-however poorly performed it may now be2 9- -
of deterring medical accidents by inducing close attention to the myriad
ways in which they can be prevented or their incidence reduced. It
is this reliance on the deterrent effect of financial responsibility for ac-
cidents which distinguishes the no-fault approach of MAI from no-fault
auto insurance, under which individuals must insure themselves and
their passengers against injury but, at least below a certain threshold,
have little or no financial responsibility for harm done to others. Be-
cause the public and their legislatures would probably be more reluc-
tant to absolve physicians from the consequences of their failures than
they were to allow unsafe drivers to escape liability to third persons,
30
28. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 127-28 (C. Hoffman, dissenting statement).
29. See note 8 supra.
30. For one thing, physicians are readily identified as a special, privileged class
seeking exoneration from responsibility for the harms they cause by professional incom-
petence. E.g., Starr, The Doctor's Discomfort: Malpractice, NEW REPUBLIC, June 28,
1975, at 16. "Unsafe drivers" are not so clearly personified or recognized as special
pleaders in the debate over auto no-fault. Moreover, they may seem less blameworthy
than the negligent physician and less subject to meaningful sanction under the fault sys-
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legislative action to supersede the fault system for dealing with medical
injuries may be difficult to obtain unless either MAI-type incentives
or quality-assurance measures of other kinds are introduced.
B. Deterrence Versus Governmental or Professional Quality Controls
Many observers, but particularly physicians, reject the notion that
incentives generated by legal liability for harms can help to improve
the quality of medical care. Senator Daniel Inouye, in introducing a
no-fault bill which would shift financial responsibility for medical in-
juries from individual providers to the federal government, 31 expressed
the widely held belief:
I believe that good doctors practice good medicine in spite of, not be-
cause of the threat of malpractice, and that they will continue to do so
after the -threat is lessened. Conversely, it is questionable whether a de-
ficient or careless doctor can be made to practice good medicine by an
external threat. In his case, it is more important that we identify him
and take steps to prevent him from endangering -the health and lives of
his patients. 3
2
Senator Inouye's bill, co-sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy, would
impose substantial new regulatory controls on physicians who elected
to participate in the projected government-run no-fault insurance pro-
gram. 3  The proposal points up the likelihood that legislative moves
to establish a no-fault scheme without a deterrence feature will carry
with them stiff substitute controls of the kind which are highly threat-
ening to doctors. 4
The standard response of the medical profession to the asserted
need for increased quality assurance is to look only to professional con-
trols and to resist reliance on either governmental controls or incentives
supplied by the fault system or any conceivable substitute for it. Dr.
Hoffman's statement referred to above, 5 while not conceding any sig-
nificant necessity for strengthened quality assurance, reflected the
tern. Finally, licensing and policing efforts may seem substantially more effective in
curbing highway than medical accidents, in part because the enforcement mechanisms
are under more effective public control in one case than in the other. Despite these
reasons for exonerating negligent drivers, no state has done so completely, suggesting
that physicians cannot hope to escape continued exposure to liability of some kind.
31. S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
32. 121 CONG. REc. S414 (1975) (remarks of Senator Inouye).
33. S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1704 (1975).
34. State legislative efforts are revealing a similar expectation of greater submission
to public control as a price of malpractice relief. See Brook, Brutoco & Williams, supra
note 6, at 1223-27.
35. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
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AMA position that peer review is the only appropriate mechanism for
achieving whatever quality control is required; his proposal that pa-
tients' protection against medical injuries be purchased by their em-
ployers was obviously designed to place the costs not on government,
which would be induced to interfere further in medical practice, but
on parties who were not well situated to introduce or press for quality
controls of any kind. Others have suggested that patients insure them-
selves through a kind of "patient flight insurance," which would be
purchased on entry into the hospital or automatically tacked onto every
hospital bill.3 6  Such risk-shifting proposals and others seeking to re-
duce or eliminate the malpractice threat to doctors are nearly always
accompanied by an obligatory call for strengthened professional con-
trols over the quality of care.
3 7
The view that controls-governmental or professional, as the case
may be-are more efficacious than incentives in maintaining the qual-
ity of care is difficult to test empirically, but it is theoretically unsound
for at least one reason. Controls necessarily operate by establishing
a minimum level which all providers must meet, and they supply no
pressure to exceed that minimum. Incentives, on the other hand,
operate on all providers all of the time, encouraging maximum atten-
tion to obtaining improved results even on the part of the very best
physicians and hospitals. The pressure is thus for performance, not
merely for compliance with minimal standards which, whether set by
professional groups themselves or by a government bureau inevitably
linked by the ties of political influence to organized providers, are un-
likely to embody very high aspirations. Controls will inevitably be
based primarily on process norms, some of them perhaps validated by
outcome studies but all of them hard to change, hard to apply, and
hard to reconcile with professional independence.
3 8
The preference for controls and against incentives is traceable in
the thinking of both Senator Inouye and Dr. Hoffman to an abiding
faith in professionalism and ethics as an adequate guarantor of high-
quality performance by all but a small minority of physicians, which
is presumed to be amenable to governmental or professional policing.
Popular as it is among physicians, this "bad-apple" theory, in addition
36. See, e.g., HEnALTH PoLIcY ANALYSIS PROGRAm, THE MALPRAcncE IssuE IN
WASHINGTON STATE 87 (Nov. 1975).
37. E.g., Editorial, supra note 27.
38. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 14, at 25-30; Havighurst & Bovbjerg,
Professional Standards Review Organizations and Health Maintenance Organizations:
Are They Compatible?, 1975 Unzr L. REv. 381, 401-04; Note, Comparative Ap-
proaches, supra note 19, at 1160-63.
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to attributing all problems to the "other guy," has a slightly elitist ring,
suggesting that physicians as a class are worthy of society's trust and
that specific guarantees of their good performance can be dispensed
with, except around the fringes.3 9 Although Senator Inouye and Dr.
Hoffman would obviously have many differences, the common ground
between them is a shared belief that incentives are not a useful mech-
anism of social control in this important area.40
Senator Inouye and Dr. Hoffman to the contrary, however, it is
not necessary to cast any aspersion on the average doctor's ethics or
motives to suggest that financial incentives may be a useful adjunct to
his sense of professional responsibility. One can even concede that a
39. See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 27. Reliance on professionalism and ethics to
compensate for consumer ignorance and uncertainty is practically essential in an indus-
try like medical care. Arrow, Government Decision Making and the Preciousness of
Life, in ETHICS OF HEALTI CARE 33 (L. Tancredi ed. 1974); Arrow, Uncertainty and
the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. Rnv. 941, 949-51, 965-66
(1963). This is not to say, however, that opportunities for supplying additional checks
on professional performance should be passed by. Cf. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773 (1975) (applying the antitrust laws to the legal profession). For a case
adopting the elitist view to limit the force of the antitrust laws in the field of education,
see Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary
Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
40. The common ground between government and the medical profession is appar-
ently large enough to support PSROs, which are extensive peer-review efforts mandated
by statute and subjected to extensive federal oversight but controlled and operated by
local practitioners. See note 14 supra. See generally Havighurst & Blumstein, supra
note 14. PSROs are being heavily relied upon to control cost and assure the quality
of care under federal financing programs, and they provide a base for an effective argu-
ment that extension of PSRO review to all care would obviate all other quality controls.
See Simmons & Bali, PSRO and the Dissolution of the Malpractice Suit, 6 U. TOLEDO
L. nv. 739 (1975).
It is noteworthy that another view widely shared in both government and the pro-
fession is that consumer sovereignty, advertising, private entrepreneurial initiative, and
competition have no substantial place in the social control of the health care industry.
But cf. Complaint, In re AMA, No. 9064 (F.T.C., Dec. 22, 1975). Just as in the case
of quality assurance, the cost controls which must substitute for market incentives are
unlikely to work well and are highly distasteful to physicians. See McClure, The Medi-
cal System Under National Health Insurance: Four Models That Might Work and Their
Prospects, 1 J. HEALTH POL., PoLicy & LAw - (1976). Because the medical profession
cannot hope to preserve the status quo indefinitely against the demand for stronger gov-
ernment controls, it might be better advised to opt for restoration of a functioning mar-
ketplace with limited regulatory oversight as a means of preserving professional inde-
pendence. Above all, this means accepting health maintenance organizations (HMOs)
as active, independent competitors in a market conducive to their operation. See id.;
Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 14; Havighurst & Bovbjerg, supra note 38. On the
subversion of HMOs by a combination of Congressional liberals and the AMA, revealing
the confluence of views on the undesirability of allowing markets to function, see Starr,
The New Medicine: An Experiment Designed to Fail, NEw REPuBLIc, Apr. 19, 1975,
at 15; Starr, The Undelivered Health System, 42 Pun. INTEREsT 66 (1976).
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highly developed sense of ethics is a hallmark of the profession-I per-
sonally believe that it is-, yet recognize that this ethical sense is not
distributed in precisely equal proportions. For the physician who feels
no overwhelming ethical responsibility to maintain his competence or
to limit his practice so as to honor the principle that he should "first,
do no harm,"41 it is highly likely, contrary to Senator Inouye's sugges-
tion, that financial incentives will be quite meaningful.
As to even the above-average doctor, his no doubt strongly felt
ethical obligation is to do what he was taught in medical school and
what he sees other doctors doing for their patients; he is probably
largely content to know that he is doing the best he knows -how under
frequently difficult circumstances. Yet there is lacking in his con-
sciousness an awareness of how his results compare with the results
achieved by other doctors. He has little feedback of information which
might put him on notice that his efforts are misdirected, that improve-
ments are possible, and that his best is not quite good enough. But
with financial incentives based on the quality of outcomes and with
claims experience supplying a convenient basis for comparing -his per-
formance with that of other physicians, such a physician would be in-
duced to re-examine his methods, to seek advice and continuing edu-
cation, to follow up with patients to check compliance with regimens
and to discover new problems, and, finally, to limit -his practice to those
problems which he is most capable of handling successfully.
The recent Study on Surgical Services for the United States
(SOSSUS) illustrates the medical profession's approach to solving qual-
ity-of-care problems. A plea is made for developing a "reliable data
base for quantifying surgical excellence," a step said to be necessary
"[i]f good surgeons are to be encouraged to operate more and poor
ones less or not at all; if good hospitals are to be expanded, mediocre
ones improved, and poor ones closed."4 2  It is reasonable to expect,
however, that a system of outcome-oriented incentives would achieve
these goals far sooner than methods such as those contemplated in the
SOSSUS report.4 3 Not only is it unnecessary to wait for a definitive
41. Physicians are familiar with the principle primum non nocere: "First, do no
harm." This appears to trace back to Hippocrates. See 1 Hi'PocRATEs 165 (Loeb Li-
brary ed. 1923).
42. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS & AMERICAN SURGICAL ASS'N, SURGERY IN
THE UNrrED STATES 192 (1975) (SOSSUS Report).
43. For an expression of government's concurrence on the means to be adopted, see
FORWARD PLAN FOR HEALTH, supra note 20, at 23:
[lt is the shared responsibility of health professionals and government to pro-
vide a reasonable basis for confidence that action will be taken both to assess
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"data base,"' 44 but it is also unnecessary to implement inevitably de-
batable quality standards by applying specific sanctions against power-
ful professionals whose resistance to outside interference is legendary.
Perhaps the profession can proceed against a tiny minority of incompe-
tents who allegedly give the profession a bad name, but there is no
way that across-the-board direct controls over surgeons and hospitals
can ever be finely tuned to achieve overall effectiveness." Only an
unobtrusive, nonpolitical system of rewards and penalties can hope to
achieve the worthy objectives specified in the SOSSUS report. Unfor-
tunately, the gap between stating these objectives and realizing them
by the means specified is so great that one may be forgiven for sus-
pecting that the surgeons are more interested in demonstrating their
good intentions than in measurably improving the fraternity's perform-
ance.
whether services meet professionally recognized standards and to correct any
deficiencies that may be found. Quality assurance is thus not a guarantee of
performance, much less of satisfactory results, but an iterative process that
leads to improved health care quality. The quality assurance process consists
of the following steps:
i. Developing and disseminating knowledge regarding the efficacy, safety,
and cost of medical procedures;
ii. Developing and disseminating knowledge regarding methods of assessing
and improving the quality of health care interventions, and
iii. Establishing organizational and administrative entities that can use the
information from steps 1 and 2 to assess and, through a variety of mecha-
nisms, improve the quality of performance, and which can contribute to
the development of new information.
44. See also id. (noting major deficiencies in the "knowledge" required for quality
assurance). It is reasonable to expect that the research studies needed to enlighten the
profession on quality-related matters would be more aggressively pursued by profes-
sional groups such as PSROs and the SOSSUS sponsors if providers had a direct finan-
cial stake in improving outcomes. The MAI system itself would supply valuable data
on outcomes and, even more important, would feed it back, in the form of higher or
lower costs, to individual providers for immediate action.
45. Most observers maintain faith that the obstacles to effective management of the
system's quality can somehow be overcome, but there is recognition that much remains
to be done:
Methodologies for assessing health care quality and methods for influenc-
ing provider performance are still primitive and need further development and
critical examination. Without a sound methodological underpinning, quality
assurance activities cannot ensure accountability for provider performance, nor
can the relationship between medical practice (process) and patient benefit
(outcome) be adequately documented.
* . . 1]t will not be possible to assure quality without an administrative
structure to see to it that the practice is aligned with theory. Id. at 23-24.
It is fair to say that hardly any responsible person in the health care system recognizes
any alternative to the peer-review method of quality assurance. It is far from clear,
however, that the entire $110 billion health care enterprise can be centrally managed
by expanding a mechanism which has so far had its only pronounced success at the insti-
tutional level and which is heavily dependent on providers' commitment and acceptance
to make it function well.
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C. What Providers Stand to Gain From an Outcome-Oriented
Incentive System
Although providers will probably resist adoption of MAI or any
other incentive-oriented quality-assurance mechanism, they may in fact
have something to gain from it. As previously noted, it seems unlikely
that substantial relief from malpractice suits will be granted without
adoption of new quality-assurance measures to compensate for the loss
of the perceived quality-enhancing benefits of the fault system. Physi-
cian accountability has become a watchword among reformers, and
most mechanisms for increasing it should seem substantially more
threatening to physicians than MAI. Even if extensive legislative relief
from the malpractice burden is obtained, the special treatment thus ac-
corded to doctors--"class legislation" it is being called in some places
-will be charged up against them in the political ledger, to be bal-
anced later on. On the other hand, if providers were willing to stand
behind their work to the limited extent contemplated by MAI, the
seemingly inexorable pressure for increased intervention in their deci-
sion-making might be reduced. The profession's political image would
be improved, and, if MAI worked well, a persuasive case could even
be made for rolling back some existing regulation.46
The outcome-oriented character of the MAI approach should also
have particular appeal to providers. Concerned about "cookbook"
medicine and defensive practice, they should respond positively to a
quality-assurance mechanism which addresses results alone and pays
little or no attention to how they were achieved. Although no imputa-
tion of fault should arise from payment of an MAI claim, the provider
may well be induced to examine both his conscience and his methods
by the reminder that reasonable expectations of a good outcome have
been disappointed. But professional independence would remain invio-
late, and providers could adopt whatever methods seemed to them, in
the exercise of their scientific learning and professional judgment, most
likely to be beneficial. All visible indications are that physicians value
their independence highly. MAI, by offering physicians the only re-
sponsible basis on which their right to exercise independent profes-
sional judgment can be preserved, challenges them to reveal whether
they in fact value simply their present nonaccountability for most bad
outcomes.47
The incentives needed to make MAI work could probably be es-
tablished without imposing on providers financial costs which seemed
46. See note 133 infra.
47. See notes 6-8 supra and accompanying text.
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punitive. Indeed, a provider's cost flowing from the occurrence of a
compensable outcome should probably be viewed more as a firm re-
minder than as a punishment, and certainly no provider should face
the possibility of being wiped out by a run of bad luck. Although ar-
riving at the appropriate level of direct provider responsibility would
be difficult,4 the program must appear to achieve substantially in-
creased accountability if it is to inhibit the trend to ever-stricter con-
trols. It does not seem necessary, however, that it be even as threaten-
ing to the average physician as the malpractice system seems to be.
It should, of course, seem substantially fairer to physicians than the pre-
vailing system and reasonably consistent with recognized professional
obligations. Fortunately, it seems probable that these conditions can
be met in a plan which, by reducing administrative costs, increases the
number of dollars available for compensating patients and allows ex-
panding the number of injuries for which compensation will be paid.
D. Supplying Incentives Under MAI
The central tenet of the MAI scheme is that financial incentives
supplied by liability rules can be a major guarantor of good-quality
medical care. Because of liability insurance and insurer rating prac-
tices, such financial incentives are an insignificant factor under the fault
system, which appears to rely primarily on stigmatization and the un-
pleasantness of the litigation process to frighten providers into avoiding
claims. Because MAI dispenses with most of the in terrorem effect
of the fault system, it must deter accidents by introducing more effec-
tive financial incentives. 49  The mechanics of supplying effective in-
48. Incentives for good care would not necessarily be too weak under MAI even if
substantially less than the full cost of accidents were borne by the responsible providers,
since providers are not usually in a position of balancing the saving from preventive
measures against the cost of taking them. See note 93 infra. The argument for deter-
rence under MA is therefore not the same as that offered for strict liability in other
areas-namely that optimizing behavior will be induced. See generally G. CALABRnsI,
THE CosTs op AcclDENs 135 et seq. (1970); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test
for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE LI. 1055 (1972); Note, Comparative Approaches,
supra note 19, at 1150-57 (discussing the applicability of tort theory to the malpractice
problem without clear recognition of the impossibility of achieving optimal deterrence
with present financing mechanisms). For a fuller discussion of this aspect of MAI and
particularly its potential impact on inducing optimal performance by HMOs, see Havig-
hurst & Tancredi 159-63, 94-96.
49. One possible qualitative loss from reducing physicians' malpractice fears could
not be made up under MAI. Although MAI makes providers accountable for technical
results, the narrowing of the patient's discretion about whether to initiate a malpractice
lawsuit might reduce providers' incentives to cultivate good relationships with patients.
See note 8 supra. Nevertheless, malpractice law is alleged to affect doctor-patient rela-
tions adversely in other respects, and the expanding physician supply, new grievance pro-
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centives are potentially complex. 50
The original MAI proposal contemplated that highly individual-
ized experience rating in setting MAI premiums would serve to provide
the desired incentives for quality assurance. The assumption was that
some of the cost of each compensable outcome could be oharged in
some relatively direct way to the insured provider and to those other
participants in the health care system who might be able to influence
the frequency of such events, perhaps through strengthened peer-re-
view efforts.5 This approach, while rational as an incentive-preserv-
ing mechanism, involves some departure from established insurance
principles, which are primarily concerned with the likelihood of future
occurrences and not with distributing the costs of past events. Indeed,
the primary purpose of liability insurance in general has been to relieve
responsible parties of the costs associated with insured events, thus
weakening incentives to avoid them. Although insurers in other areas
have revealed some concern with accident avoidance, malpractice in-
surers have shown little interest in using rates either for deterrent pur-
poses or as a recoupment measure even if desirable incentives for
claims reduction would result.52 One hopes that the actuaries called
upon to implement MAI could be induced to take an active interest
in doing more than passively assembling the funds to pay future claims.
cedures, and greater emphasis on consumer choice and advertising could also offset any
loss which might be feared. The law of informed consent, which would not be affected
by MAI, might also play an important continuing role. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence,
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.
3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Note, Restructuring Informed Consent:
Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533 (1970).
50. The costs borne by providers must have a direct impact and not be passed
through to some third party. Although doctors are thought by some to be free to pass
costs on to their patients, there are substantial limits to their ability to recoup in this
fashion, and no physician would be wholly indifferent to his costs. It is clear that pro-
viders should not be able automatically to treat their actual premium costs or cost-shar-
ing outlays as expenses for purposes of determining fees under fee schedules or cost-
related reimbursement; rather, the average outlay for providers similarly situated should
be so treated, leaving the provider free to profit from any lower premium resulting from
good past experience and exposed to a loss from higher premiums. If the tax laws
should continue to permit a business deduction for actual insurance premiums and pay-
ments under cost-sharing provisions, INT. R v. CODE OF 1954 § 162, the government
would, in effect, share the cost of a provider's poor performance. Under these circum-
stances, a substantially larger premium or cost-sharing obligation would be required to
make incentives meaningful.
51. See Havighurst & Tancredi 129-30, 140, 162-63; 72-73, 80, 96.
52. The random incidence of claims, see notes 6-7 supra, under the present system
suggests that past claims may be poor indicators of future ones and that it would not
be rational to set premiums in relation to experience. Practice appears to be that premi-
ums are raised only after several claims. See Steves, supra note 4 at 1322; Roddis &
Stewart, The Insurance of Medical Losses, 1975 DuKr L.J. 1281.
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The mandatory and highly detailed experience rating contem-
plated in the original MAI proposal would require legislation and ad-
ministrative oversight to achieve the fine-tuning visualized.5 While an
alternative possibility would be simply to define the events which must
be covered and allow insurers to develop their own rating categories,
this approach might fail to yield meaningful incentives. Not only have
malpractice insurers not been accustomed to much individualizing of
premiums, but actuarial considerations, dictating that rates be set only
for large, non-self-selected groups, give the market some natural
monopoly characteristics. Moreover, insurance regulation reinforces
the monopolistic pattern and further retards the kind of competitive
pricing innovation required to make MAI effective. Despite these rea-
sons for fearing that insurers acting alone in implementing the no-fault
model might not greatly strengthen provider incentive, one characteris-
tic of MAI offers hope: the larger number and increased predictability
of insured events under MAI would facilitate experience rating,54 thus
perhaps allowing meaningful incentives to be achieved without regula-
tion which was unduly disruptive of existing insurance practices.
If experience rating could not be expected as a spontaneous de-
velopment, a possible means of creating quality-assurance incentives in
an MAI program without extensive interference with the insurance in-
dustry would be simply to impose a share of the cost of each claim di-
rectly on the responsible providers through some kind of deductible or
coinsurance requirement. The possibilities are limitless, but appro-
priate incentives could probably be achieved without imposing large
costs on individual providers. For example, the insured provider might
be made responsible for, say, ten percent of each claim up to $50,000,
with such amounts to be reimbursed to the insurer as part of future
premiums over a five-year period. An alternative, or additional, mech-
anism would be a deductible under which an insured physician would
pay the first, say, $10,000 of claims in any year and would profit by
that amount if he avoided all compensable events. Cost-sharing ar-
rangements might differ for different events, perhaps taking effect only
after a certain number of claims had been paid and thus reflecting the
degree to which a certain number of such events were thought to be
unavoidable.
53. Different experience-rating formulae were contemplated for different events, so
that incentives could be tailored to the needs of the particular case. See Havighurst &
Tancredi 140, 80.
54. See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text. Experience rating is deemed fea-
sible in.workmen's compensation when premiums exceed $500 per year. NAT'L COMM'N
ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT 98 (1972).
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It is possible that insurers providing no-fault coverage would vol-
untarily offer policies with coinsurance or deductible features.5 5 These
features would reduce premiums and would be attractive to those pro-
viders who anticipated few claims and therefore saw an advantage in
limited self-insurance. If the insurance industry appeared insufficiently
competitive to produce this self-insurance option spontaneously, it might
be made mandatory by legislation or by state insurance regulation.
The mechanism for establishing a reasonable set of incentives for
accident deterrence cannot be specified without further study of the
insurance industry, the available techniques for distributing costs, and
the advantages and difficulties of tailoring the impact to fit particular
cases. As to some situations at least, it seems likely that regulatory
attention would be desirable to fine-tune incentives and to assure that
insurance rating practices (lid not neglect deterrence. Legislation to
establish MAI should charge the administrators with responsibility for
developing a reasonable deterrence feature through the use of such
regulatory powers as were necessary to make it work both fairly and
effectively.
IIH. THE No-FAULT NOTION AS APPLIED TO MEDICAL CARE:
COMPENSABLE EVENTS
A. The Complexities of Identifying Compensable Events
Several examinations of the prospects for employing no-fault con-
cepts to relieve the medical malpractice crisis have concluded that the
problems confronted in identifying compensable events are extremely
great, perhaps insuperable. 6 The chief problem is that many vari-
ables, including patient idiosyncrasies, may determine the effects of a
given medical treatment and the extent of any injury, so that many bad
results can be as easily regarded as incidents of the patient's presenting
condition as attributed to a "medical injury." Unless the no-fault
scheme is to be simply a social insurance plan indemnifying as many
losses as possible, some notion of preventable harm seems needed to
identify compensable events. 57 Unfortunately, attention to prevent-
55. However, such spontaneous cost-sharing provisions would probably not produce
the same incentives for peer review contemplated in the MM proposal. Havighurst &
Tancredi 139-40, 162; 80, 96.
56. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE R PORT 101; 'Roth & Rosenthal, Non Fault Based Medi-
cal Injury Compensation Systems, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT Appendix 450;
Note, Comparative Approaches, supra note 19; Keeton, Compensation for Medical Acci-
dents, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 615 (1973). Carlson, Conceptualization of a No-Fault
Compensation System for Medical Injuries, 7 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 329 (1973).
57. The cost of a program to compensate all "medical injuries" or all iatrogenic in-
juries would be considerable. Two studies conducted for the HEW Secretary's Commis-
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ability would open up questions very similar to those involved in apply-
ing the fault system (suggesting that "no-faulf' would be a misnomer)
and would invite second-guessing of almost any outcome less than full
recovery. To avoid such inquiries, proposals for comprehensive no-fault
coverage have drawn the line defining compensability on the basis of
whether the cause of any bad result is to be found in the patient's di-
sease or in the medical care system itself. Iatrogenicity is thus the key
to such comprehensive no-fault plans."
The apparent necessity under a comprehensive no-fault system for
determining the cause of every resulting condition has led Professor
Robert Keeton to question the advantage of such a system over the
present one.59 He suggests that the administrative cost in time and
money of determining causation, when added to over-all cost increases
due to an increase in the number of claims, may not be worth the gains
in the form of a diminished threat to the reputations of physicians and
standardization of compensation payments. The vast amount of litiga-
tion spawned by the "work-relatedness" of injuries under workmen's
compensation serves as a warning against leaving too many factual is-
sues open to dispute.6
Despite the foregoing reasons for despair over the prospects for
a no-fault system, the MAI proposal offered a tentatively hopeful view.
sion on Medical Malpractice revealed that substantial percentages (8.5 percent and 7.6
percent, respectively) of hospitalized patients suffer some medical injury. See Boyden,
Medical Injuries Described in Hospital Patient Records, in MEDICAL MALPRAcTICE RE-
PORT Appendix 41 (declining to state the 8.5 percent figure in part because the
sample was not necessarily unbiased); Pocincki, Dogger & Schwartz, The Incidence
of latrogenic Injuries, in MEDICAL MALPRACnCE REPORT Appendix 50, 55.
58. The studies by Boyden, supra note 57, and Pocincki, Dogger & Schwartz, supra
note 57, both applied a causation test, as would the compensation schemes proposed by
S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See note 60 infra. See generally MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE REPORT 113 (C. Hoffman, dissenting statement); and Roth & Rosenthal, supra
note 56.
59. Keeton, supra note 56. Professor Keeton is not unfriendly to the no-fault idea,
only unconvinced of its utility in this particular setting. Moreover, he was writing be-
fore the MAI proposal was published.
60. See generally 1 A. LARsON, THE Lw OF WoRlEmEN's COMENSATION ch. II
(1972). Some inkling of the administrative fact-finding burden which would be entailed
by an open-ended no-fault scheme can be gained from the language of the Kennedy-
Inouye no-fault bill, S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). This bill would provide "com-
pensation for loss from any injury suffered as a result of health care services provided
by an insured. . . ." Id. § 1711(a). The bill further specifies that "an injury 'results'
from the provision of health care services when it is more probably associated in whole
or in part with the provision of such services than with the condition for which such
services were provided." Id. § 1721(8). If the draftsmen did not really intend to make
all evidence of possible intervening causes inadmissible, see, e.g., Havighurst & Tancredi
147-49, 85-87, the final phrase should read "than with some other cause." In either
event, it is not clear how patients' idiosyncracies would affect compensability.
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It suggested that case-by-case adjudication of medical injuries and ex-
posure to unmanageable costs could be avoided if a highly specified
list of compensable injuries were developed in advance and incorpo-
rated in an insurance policy covering only those injuries, leaving other
adverse outcomes to be handled under traditional doctrines and pro-
cedures, however they might be modified. Ideally, the list of events
compensable under the MAI policy would be developed in such a way
that each event would be readily recognizable when it occurred, with
no occasion for further inquiry as to its etiology. 1 An event would
be added to the list if medical opinion indicated that the event was us-
ually or frequently-though by no means invariably-avoidable under
good-quality medical care and that the frequency of the event could
be expected to diminish if providers' attention were directed more
strongly to the quality of the outcomes being achieved. Not all mal-
practice cases would be removed from the courts under this plan, but
many would be.62 Moreover, the list would be lengthened over time,
beginning with the most obvious occurrences and later expanding to
cover outcomes which, though seldom the subject of a lawsuit, were
deemed avoidable in many instances.
Although the original MAI plan tentatively suggested some in-
juries for inclusion on the list of compensable events, its primary em-
phasis was on the analytics of list compilation. It stressed the necessity
for fairness in not including events which in the contemplation of pro-
viders are very often unavoidable, although it argued the legitimacy of
including some unavoidable events wherever necessary to eliminate a
causation issue or to achieve another practical objective. Providers
were urged to recognize that, while avoidability of an event is a factor
in its inclusion on the list and the major goal of the system is to prevent
avoidable events, the system nevertheless remains a "no-fault" scheme
since blame is not in fact assessed in specific cases. Although physi-
cians may resist the strict liability notion of automatic payment for out-
comes which are sometimes unavoidable, it is in fact the inclusion of
some unavoidable events in the listed outcomes which would shelter
the provider from any imputation of fault whenever a patient suffers
a compensable harm. There are thus positive advantages to providers,
as well as to patients, from including some unavoidable events within
the coverage of the compensation scheme. Even so, physicians (and
others) contemplating MAI continually slip back into equating liability
61. See Havighurst & Tancredi 143-50, 83-88 (detailed illustration of the process of
listing an event-hepatitis contracted within six months following a blood transfusion-
in such a way as to exclude debate over causation).
62. See note 107 infra.
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with blame, revealing that getting people to accept fully the notion of
liability without fault requires considerable re-education. 3
The criteria for listing an event as compensable would include
several other factors in addition to the event's relative avoidability and
the ease with which its occurrence or nonoccurrence could be estab-
lished in specific instances. One complex issue is presented by the
need to guard against the danger that making an adverse outcome of
one course of treatment compensable would distort rather than improve
treatment decisions, perhaps by causing providers to select a less ap-
propriate treatment mode because of a reduced likelihood of a com-
pensable outcome.64 The ability of various providers engaged in the
treatment process to take direct or indirect action to prevent or mini-
mize harm would also have to be considered in deciding whose MAI
policy should cover a particular event.6 5
Another factor which would undoubtedly enter into the specifica-
tion of compensable events is the need of patients for compensation,
which would be small wherever the main expense was medical costs
largely covered under other programs. 6 However, adherence to the
principles of MAI would caution against excluding at least highly avoid-
able events from compensation on this ground, since it would mean los-
ing an opportunity for injury deterrence. The saving to the MAI pro-
gram from excluding such events might be much less than the continued
cost of avoidable injuries to other public and private financing programs.
63. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize liability without fault is to recognize that
a loss has already occurred and that it is a legitimate social issue whether the loss should
be left where it falls, subject to any insurance which the victim may have obtained, or
should be shifted by legal means to someone else. The social cost of shifting the loss
can only be justified if some offsetting benefit appears, but such a benefit may be found
in improved incentives. Thus, it may not be at all difficult to justify placing the risk
on a hospital or physician, either of which is almost always in a better position than
the patient to minimize the risk by direct action or by inducing different behavior by
the patient or by other participants in the treatment. See CALABRBsI, supra note 48;
Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 48. Physicians are already exposed to various kinds
of vicarious liability-under the doctrines of respondeat superior, "borrowed servant,"
and the "captain of the ship"--based on similar principles. See note 89 infra. Despite
the clear legitimacy of the no-fault liability principle, the MAI proposal nevertheless ex-
presses a concern for physicians' perception of fairness and would push the bounds of
liability only as far as quality gains were reasonably in prospect. See Havighurst &
Tancredi 135-39, 77-79.
64. See text accompanying notes 99-106 infra.
65. See text accompanying notes 97-99 infra.
66. See text accompanying notes 110-15 infra. Malpractice claims are probably
less likely to occur where the patient bears no out-of-pocket financial loss. Viewing
MAI primarily as an answer to the problem of malpractice claims would therefore dic-
tate its coverage of other areas first.
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Expected dollar cost is probably an inevitable additional factor in
listing compensable events, since introducing compensation where it is
not now paid would be expensive. Although the theory of MAI would
not admit cost as a legitimate consideration, 67 it probably could not be
ruled out as a practical matter in a functioning program.
B. Progress in Developing a List of Compensable Events
The suggested compensable events in the original MAI proposal
were merely illustrative of possibilities. 8 The only set of events care-
fully considered at that time was blood transfusion reactions."' Al-
though the MAI proposal contemplated extensive professional investi-
gation of numerous events which were candidates for the list, no pro-
fessional groups have taken up the project, and it has not been possible
to involve physicians extensively in subsequent investigations. The re-
sults of further specification efforts are therefore still highly tentative.
Our recent efforts toward compiling a definitive list of compen-
sable events have concentrated on anesthesiology and general sur-
gery.70 The approaches taken in these two areas have differed sub-
stantially, and the differences are useful in illustrating the possibilities
and flexibility of MAI.
1. General Surgery
Compensable outcomes for general surgery have been tentatively
specified both with respect to surgery of all kinds and with respect to
specific procedures.71  The proposed list of compensable events in this
area is as follows:
67. See text accompanying notes 109-12 infra.
68. Havighurst & Tancredi 134, 76.
69. These were deemed appropriate for compensation under a hospital-purchased
MAI policy even in the case of certain hepatitis reactions which were neither clearly
avoidable nor clearly caused by the transfusion. Id. at 143-50, 83-88.
70. The original proposal addressed orthopedics injuries. Id. at 133-35, 75-76. See
also Tancredi, Identifying Avoidable Adverse Events in Medicine, 12 MED. CARE 935
(1974).
71. The list was compiled by reviewing the most common surgical complications and
considering them in light of the following questions:
1. To what extent is the incidence of this complication related to the technical
skill, judgment, or attentiveness of the surgeon?
2. Is this complication a clinically distinct entity? Can its existence be readily
substantiated?
3. How early in the postoperative period is this complication detectable?
4. How costly are the sequelae of this complication?
5. Would an incentive to minimize the occurrence of this complication bias the
choice of treatment in unfortunate ways?
The primary source consulted was MANAGEMENT OF SURGICAL COMPLICATIONS (3d ed.
C. Artz & J. Hardy 1975).
The most obvious candidates for a list of compensable events are those which courts
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General
1. Foreign bodies acquired intraoperatively
2. Burnsacquired intraoperatively
3. Injury resulting from severance of an indwelling plastic cathe-
ter72
4. Neurological deficit resulting from intramuscular injection
5. Injury resulting from mistaken identity
6. Injury resulting from inadvertent intravascular injection of local
anesthetic
7. Postoperative wound dehiscence in noncarcinomatous patient
under age forty-five
73
8. Tetanus infection subsequent to treatment of wound
9. Severe reaction to administration of tetanus antitoxin
[on irreversible neurological damage or death following intra-
operative cardiac arrest or spiral anesthesia, see Anesthesiology
below].
Procedure-specific
Parathyroid surgery or thyroidectomy
10. Permanent recurrent laryngeal nerve damage
74
would treat under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; there seems little to be said for case-
by-case litigation of claims based upon foreign bodies acquired intraoperatively (#1),
burns acquired intraoperatively (#2), surgical procedures erroneously performed on the
wrong patient (#5), and a hemolytic reaction to a blood transfusion (#25, see also
Havighurst & Tancredi 144, 83).
72. The relative avoidability of this complication is illustrated by the striking dim-
inution of its incidence as practitioners have become more aware of the technical mis-
take which creates the difficulty. "Such occurrences can be minimized by careful atten-
tion to the management of the catheter and the catheter site as well as the utilization
of radiopaque catheters and the careful measurement of the length of the catheter before
insertion and after removal." Moncrief, Complications of Parenteral Fluid Therapy, in
MANAGEMENT OF SURGICAL COMPLICATIONS, supra note 71, at 68, 75.
73. "Studies have shown that a few surgeons will have many wounds with de-
hiscence and others will have extremely few. Surgical technique is important." Hunt,
Wound Complication, in MANAGEMENT OF SURGICAL COMPLICATIONS, supra note 71, at
21, 25. A number of technical errors are known to increase the likelihood of dehis-
cence. Other variables, such as age and condition of the patient and the type of opera-
tion performed, also affect the incidence of this complication. Restricting compensabil-
ity to patients under forty-five would help to screen out the effects of the principal vari-
ables that lie beyond the surgeon's control.
74. "In the hands of competent surgeons experienced in exposing the recurrent
laryngeal nerves, permanent nerve injury occurs in less than 1 per cent of cases." Hardy,
Complications of Thyroid and Parathyroid Surgery, in MANAGEMENT OF SURGICAL COM-
PLICATIONS, supra note 71, at 291, 300. Technical skill and attentiveness are probably
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12. Death in the immediate postoperative period76
Cholecystectomy
13. Injury to common bile duct7"
Venous stripping
14. Injury from inadvertent stripping of femoral artery
Gastrointestinal procedures
15. Inadvertent gastroileostomy 78
16. Duodenal stump leakage following gastric resection79
17. Instrumental perforation of esophagus
80
the key variables determining the incidence of the complication. Permanent abnormal
phonation and serious respiratory obstruction are the sequelae involved.
75. If all four parathyroid glands are inadvertently removed during surgery, hypo-
calcemic tetany will result, and lifelong drug therapy will be necessary to compensate
for the activity of the removed glands. "In a review of 600 cases of thyroid surgery
.. . 17 (2.8 per cent) cases of transient postoperative hypocalcemic tetany and nine
(1.5 per cent) cases of permanent hypoparathyroidism 1[were found]." Id. Preserving
the parathyroids during total thyroidectomies for thyroid malignancy is a difficult tech-
nical feat; for this reason some may suggest that compensability be restricted to patients
without thyroid malignancy. Others may argue that precisely because of the difficulty
of the procedure, the adverse outcome should be made compensable to deter less tech-
nically competent surgeons from attempting the operation.
76. Careful observations in the postoperative period will prevent the fatal conse-
quence of uncontrolled hemorrhage. 'The most distressing fact is that, though this
hazard and possible sequelae are well known on all active surgical services, every 3 or
4 years in most general hospitals some patient loses his life from this cause." Id. at
296. Designating "death" as the compensable event rather than "postoperative hem-
orrhage" serves three goals: (1) Death is obviously not subject to the definitional prob-
lems inherent in a term like "hemorrhage." (2) Hemorrhage promptly noticed and con-
trolled will not result in injury significant enough to compensate. (3) While the hem-
orrhage itself is of questionable avoidability, the surgeon can affect the consequences of
hemorrhage by careful postoperative monitoring.
77. Careless dissection and blind clamping of bleeding vessels can produce an injury
to the common bile duct. "Perhaps less than half of those who sustain a stricture due
to operative injury survive for 10 years." Glenn, Complications Following Operations
Upon the Billary Tract, in MANAoEumNT oF SuRGIcAL CoMImcIATIoNs, supra note 71,
at 501, 521.
78. This technical error can be avoided by careful identification of anatomical
structures. Its occurrence necessitates reoperation.
79. Duodenal stump leakage is the most serious common complication and the main
source of mortality in gastric resections. Surgical judgment, technical skill, and postop-
erative management are among the variables affecting its incidence.
80. As the use of instrumentation in the treatment of GI conditions has increased,
instrumental perforation of the esophagus has emerged as a serious complication. This
outcome is relatively avoidable.
1258 [Vol. 1975:1233
Vol. 1975:1233] MEDICAL ADVERSITY INSURANCE
Gynecology81
18. Perforation of uterus during dilatation and curettage
19. Vesicovaginal, ureterovaginal, rectovaginal, or enterovaginal fis-
tula following gynecological procedure on noncarcinomatous
patient
20. Permanent damage to ureter
Prostatectomy
21. Rectal injury
22. Permanent urinary incontinence
Treatment of fracture
23. Nerve paralysis following treatment with straps, splits, or casts8 2
24. Function-impairing deformity from malunion of fractures3
Blood transfusion
25. Hemolytic reaction s4
26. Bacterial sepsis
27. Serum hepatitis 5
Nephrectomy
28. Nephrectomy in the absence of a normally functioning contra-
lateral kidney
It is stressed that the various items on the foregoing list are subject
to further specification, which might rule out compensation for patients
with a special predisposition toward the result if that predisposition
could be clearly identified in practice. Clinicians' assistance is clearly
necessary in refining the list in this and other ways. 6 It should be
noted that postoperative wound infections are omitted from the list,
although they were nominated for inclusion in the original proposal.8 7
81. These complications are highly avoidable.
82. "Delayed nerve paralysis is practically always secondary to faulty treatment."
Hampton, Complications of Common Fractures, in MATAGEMENT OF SURGICAL COMPrI-
CATfONS, supra note 71, at 699, 708.
83. "The term 'malunion' really implies union of a fracture in a function-impairing
deformity which could have been prevented by more skillful management of the frae-
ture." Id. at 709-10.
84. Havighurst & Tancredi 144,83.
85. Id. at 144-50, 83-88.
86. See note 104 infra and accompanying text.




In anesthesiology, highly detailed specification of events compen-
sable under MAI, such as .has been attempted for general surgery, is
appropriate for dental and peripheral nerve injuries occurring under
anesthesia, and such injuries should be included on the list covered by
the anesthesiologist's MAI policy. This piecemeal approach seems in-
adequate, however, to manage the most serious adverse consequences
of anesthesia, namely death or irreversible central nervous system dam-
age occurring in a wide variety of surgical circumstances. Although
a more sweeping approach is indicated to cover such outcomes, under-
taking to compensate all such injuries and deaths occurring during or
shortly after the operation seems likely to encompass many occurrences
which are essentially unavoidable, being attributable to the patient's de-
teriorated condition and the inherent risks of surgery. For example,
the operative death of an elderly patient with numerous physiological
disturbances or of a victim of a gunshot wound to the chest does not
raise the same presumption of avoidability which attends the death of
a young adult undergoing a gall bladder operation.
Because establishing "operative death" as a compensable event is
too nonspecific to assure that the goal of fairness is being realized, it
is desirable to separate, in at least a rudimentary way, those fatal car-
diac arrests and central nervous system injuries under anesthesia which
are likely to be avoidable from those which are not. One possible ap-
proach is to inquire deeply into the patient's condition and the particu-
lar practices (dosage, type of ventilation, and so forth) employed, but
this approach would necessitate costly case-by-case inquiries. A sim-
pler and more outcome-oriented approach is to adopt a broad classifica-
tion which excludes some patients on the basis of age and the urgency
elude this particular adverse outcome as a compensable event may help illustrate the ap-
plication of the relevant criteria for selection. Postoperative wound infection is unques-
tionably an adverse outcome of sizable significance; some studies have indicated that a
serious postoperative infection results in an average cost of approximately $7,000 per
patient to the national economy. Hardy, Surgical Complications, in TExrBOOK OF
SURGERY 398, 404 (10th ed. D. Sabiston 1972). Nevertheless, reluctance to designate
"postoperative wound infection" as a compensable event is justified for the following
reasons: (1) It is not a clinically distinct entity. Some infections are trivial; others
are life-threatening. Serious definitional difficulties could be anticipated. (2) Variables
other than those within the surgeon's control are primarily determinative of its incidence.
'The incidence of wound infection varies from less than 1 per cent in clean primarily
closed wounds to 25 per cent or more in wounds created by emergency operations on
the injured colon or perforated appendix." Hunt, supra note 73, at 28. The type and
location of the wound, the type of micro-organisms invading, and the time lag between
contamination and the institution of care are as important as surgical technique in de-
termining whether or not an infection develops.
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of the procedure. Thus, it is tentatively proposed to make compensa-
ble under MAI any death or irreversible central nervous system injury
under anesthesia occurring in a patient between six months and sixty
years of age undergoing any of .the following procedures: tonsillectomy,
cholecystectomy, hysterectomy, dilatation and curettage, repair of in-
guinal or hiatal hernia, abortion, sterilization, uterine suspension, ven-
ous stripping, thyroidectomy, mastectomy, and gastrectomy.
The foregoing list encompasses most of the common surgical pro-
cedures, but excludes many, such as obstetrical procedures and ap-
pendectomies, which must frequently be done on an emergency basis.
It thus reflects a judgment that, since the listed procedures are almost
always scheduled in advance, the anesthesiologist will seldom be faced
with the necessity for anesthetizing a rapidly deteriorating patient who
cannot be adequately prepared for surgery. s8 The list of covered pro-
cedures could be readily expanded if it were possible to distinguish
emergency from nonemergency procedures after the fact and if an un-
due temptation to treat patients on an emergency basis would not be
created. Clinicians' judgments would be necessary to clarify such mat-
ters and to identify additional procedures which could be safely in-
cluded on the list.
One additional variable affecting the likelihood of a cardiac arrest,
the competence of the surgeon, needs to be isolated in defining MAI
liability of the anesthesiologist, since relieving the surgeon of all re-
sponsibility for intraoperative arrest would ignore his critical role.89 In
order to preserve the surgeon's incentives and to meet the fairness cri-
terion in the treatment of anesthesiologists, liability might be divided
88. A recent review of 286 anesthesia-related deaths found that the inadequate prep-
aration which complicates emergency surgery was responsible for more than half the fa-
tal outcomes. Report of Special Committee Investigating Deaths Under Anesthesia, 12
MED. J. Ausm. 579 (1970).
89. The law of medical malpractice has found it difficult to draw lines of demarca-
tion between the surgeon's area of responsibility and the anesthesiologist's sphere. Tra-
ditionally, the surgeon in an operating room has been held responsible, as "captain of
the ship," for all acts or omissions of attendant medical personnel, even of hospital em-
ployees, who are deemed to serve the surgeon as "borrowed servants." A. HOLDER, sU-
pra note 16, at 207-09; 1. D. LOuiSELL & H. WiLLIAMS, supra note 16, "I 16.01 n.21,
16.05 nn.60 & 67. With advances in the technical demands of anesthesia, the field has
become specialized, and the anesthesiologist has become an important figure, medically
responsible for the patient's well-being during an operation. Some jurisdictions' mal-
practice decisions have recognized this bifurcation of responsibility, e.g., Thompson v.
Lillehei, 273 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1959), while others have not, e.g., Mazer v. Lipschutz,
327 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 833 (1966) (noting there can be
only one "captain of the ship"). See also 1 D. LoisELL & H. WiLLAMs, supra note
16, 16.06 & nn.87-88; Note, Pennsylvania's Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine: A Mid-
Twentieth Century Anachronism, 71 DICK. L. R1v. 432 (1967).
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between the anesthesiologist and the surgeon as follows: During in-
duction and again during the immediate postoperative period, the anes-
thesiologist would be liable for fatal or debilitating arrests among pa-
tients in the age range and. procedure categories specified; from the
time of the initial incision until removal of the patient from the operat-
ing room, the anesthesiologist and the surgeon would each be liable
for half the patient's damages cognizable under MAIY° If liability
could not be coordinated because the surgeon was not covered by MAI,
the usual rules of joint and several liability would presumably govern,
leaving the surgeon with the entire residual burden if his negligence
should be proved.
Compensability based on patient age and procedure is justified in
part by the expectation shared by laymen and physicians alike that
death or serious injury should not occur when the anesthesiologist and
surgeon are dealing with a basically sound, young organ system and
have discretion as to the timing of the procedure. Even though some
young patients undergoing elective procedures present difficult prob-
lems for the anesthesiologist and surgeon and may suffer an arrest de-
spite the best care, the seeming arbitrariness of providing compensation
in such a case is not automatically a ground for rejecting the scheme
but should rather be viewed as a price of achieving administrative feasi-
bility. Selection of this method of categorization does not imply fault
or avoidability but merely suggests that the quality of care is potentially
improvable, and the malpractice problem reducible, by adopting this
technique of making physicians responsible for the outcomes they in
fact achieve without regard to how or why they occurred.91 This is
90. It is understood that the operating room ritual is such that the relevant points
in time are easily marked.
91. This general approach to problems in anesthesiology and surgery appears to be
wholly consistent with the interests of the best elements in the medical profession in
improving results, as illustrated by the SOSSUS undertakings in quality assessment.
SOSSUS REPORT, supra note 42, at 191-93. The findings of the National Halothane
Study, NAT'L AcADEMY OF SCIENCES, ThE NATIONAL HALoTANE STUDY ch. IV-2
(1969), of substantial divergence among thirty-four hospitals in the outcomes of anes-
thesia no doubt reflects even wider variations in experience among individual surgeons
and anesthesiologists, and reveals the potential for MAI-induced improvement in the
quality of outcomes. See also SOSSUS REPORT, supra note 42, at 190-91. The SOSSUS
effort, as well as an ongoing study by the National Academy of Sciences, see id. at 189,
may shed further light on the existing range of quality. Such studies may also yield
useful findings on how to improve surgical results, but there is good reason to anticipate
that implementation of such findings would be quicker and more universal with MAi
than without it. For a preliminary report on the SOSSUS quality study, see Study on
Quality of Surgery is Unveiled, MED. WORLD N-ws, Jan. 26, 1976, at 24 (forty-seven
percent of adverse events and thirty-five percent of deaths were deemed preventable by
surgeons reviewing the case).
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not to say, however, that additional refinements could not be made in
the definition of the compensable event.92
IV. MArs PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
A. Will Deterrence Really Work?
The arguments offered for MAI's deterrence feature and the cri-
teria recommended for designing a selective list of compensable events
both assume that medical injuries are in fact deterrable by employing
financial incentives. Nevertheless, some observers undoubtedly be-
lieve that this assumption would prove to be unwarranted or at least
that the quality gains to be expected are so minimal as not to be worth
the trouble.9 3 Though the question is one which could only be an-
92. One further possibility would be to exclude from compensation patients who
have undergone other major surgery within the previous year, a circumstance highly sug-
gestive of a fragile or deteriorating physical condition. Also, certain surgical procedures,
such as operations on the heart itself, present severe risks and might readily be excluded
from MAI coverage.
93. Brook, Brutoco & Williams, supra note 6, might take this position judging from
their stance on more general issues. Although proof of the effectiveness of MAI-type
deterrence in medical care is impossible, but see note 94 infra, the field of industrial
accidents and workmen's compensation might be consulted for clues. The analogy is
a distant one, but there is some doubt that deterrence features in workmen's compensa-
tion have reduced accidents. Thus, James Chelius found injury rates higher in states
with higher benefits. Chelius, The Control of Industrial Accidents: Economic Theory
and Empirical Evidence, 38 LAw & CoTEmBP. PROB. 700, 714-15 (1974). His results
have been questioned, however. 0i, On the Economics of Industrial Safety, 38 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 669, 693-94 (1974). Moreover, it is not clear that the level of bene-
fits correlates with the actual strength of incentives since insurer premium-setting prac-
tices may vary. More important, if wage rates adjust to changes in benefit (risk) lev-
els, the expected incentive effect from higher benefits might be cancelled out. Id. at
692-93. Thus, the expectation of improved safety may be misplaced. Another study
produced results
consistent with the hypothesis that, across industries, work injury rates are in-
versely correlated with the cost to employers of injuries. In other words, em-
ployers do seem to be responsive in their safety efforts to the cost of injuries.
It would therefore appear that, other things being equal, an injury tax would
result in a reduction of the injury rate. Smith, The Feasibility of an "Injury
Tax" Approach to Occupational Safety, 38 LAw & CoNTrEmp. PRoB. 730, 741
(1974).
A further conclusion was that the injury tax "required to reduce these rates by even mod-
erate amounts would have to be very large." Id. at 742.
These observations are very far from shedding light on MAI's likely deterrent ef-
fect. For one thing, employers face trade-offs between the cost of injuries and the costs
of avoiding them and will respond to incentives only if there is a net benefit to them
in doing so. Providers under MAI (other than HMOs) would usually have no such cost
constraint operating on them, and would be free to respond to the incentive imposed.
See notes 24 & 48 supra. Of course, incentives might have to be stronger if effective
cost constraints existed, as they do in HMOs. See Havighurst & Tancredi 156-59, 91-
94.
Another reason why industrial injury experience is a poor guide is the relatively
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swered empirically with respect to each particular class of injuries,
some further explication of MAI's deterrence feature should establish
that it is worth serious attention.
4
Although many untoward medical events are in fact unavoidable
because of the limits of scientific knowledge, many other outcomes are
not always the result of chance alone but might be avoided at least part
of the time by the exercise of greater skill or precaution.9" If the in-
stances of unavoidable harm could not be readily excluded from com-
pensation by application of a predetermined definition, classification of
the suspect outcome as automatically compensable would still be appro-
priate, since some deterrence could be expected even though flawless
provider performance would not eliminate all bad results. Moreover,
even if a certain kind of event was technically unavoidable in every
instance, its compensability by providers under MAI might still achieve
several very useful objectives. First, it might generate more research
to obtain the knowledge necessary to avert the unwanted outcome.
Second, it might encourage greater circumspection about using the pro-
cedure which exposes the patient to the risk. And, third, it might stim-
ulate greater efforts to minimize the adverse consequences once the
unavoidable event occurs. It is not obvious, of course, whether the po-
tential gains in these areas would be great enough to warrant incurring
minor importance of the matter to employers. Workmen's compensation insurance
premiums average around one percent of wages, and safety is not central to the employ-
er's overall business. On the other hand, a health care provider is likely to be highly
conscious of MAI premiums and costs and of the outcomes which his patients experi-
ence.
94. The original MAI proposal developed a strong case for paying compensation in
all cases of adverse reactions following blood transfusions, estimating that $133 million
in damages for post-transfusion hepatitis was potentially avoidable under appropriate in-
centives. Havighurst & Tancredi 144-50, 154-55; 83-88, 90-91. See generally Calabresi
& Bass, Right Approach, Wrong Implications: A Critique of McKean on Products Lia-
bility, 38 U. Cu. L. REv. 74, 83-86 (1970); Franklin, Tort Liability and Hepatitis: An
Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REv. 439 (1972); Kessel, Transfused Blood, Serum
Hepatitis, and The Coase Theorem, 17 J. LAw & ECON. 265 (1974). The argument for
deterrence in this case is very strong, and clinicians should be able to think of other
areas (or particular providers) where the potential quality gains are great enough to give
MAI intuitive appeal. See also note 91 supra for further suggestive evidence.
95. On the distinction between avoidable and unavoidable events, see Gorovitz &
MacIntyre, Toward a Theory of Medical Fallibility, HAsTrNGs CENTER REP. 13 (Dec.
1975). These authors, in their highly abstract but interesting article, do not address
the difficulty of distinguishing avoidable and unavoidable injuries, the probable ineffec-
tiveness and high costs associated with professional controls, or the possible value of in-
centives based on something more certain than the possibility of an authoritative finding
of culpability or negligence. Oi, supra note 93, at 679, notes that many industrial acci-
dents are not avoidable by employers; indeed contributory negligence is no defense to
a workmen's compensation claim. MA's categories will go as far as is practical in dis-
tinguishing avoidable from unavoidable events.
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the administrative costs of shifting the loss. Nevertheless, the possibil-
ity of such benefits would have to be considered for a wide range of
events. Moreover, the social desirability of spreading the loss from the
injured patient to society as a whole might also point toward allowing
compensation in a close case,96 particularly since providers' costs for
such unavoidable events would probably be distributed randomly
enough that they could be readily passed on in fees."r
Accident avoidance induced by MAIs deterrence feature might
frequently result from action taken by parties other than the provider
primarily responsible for the care giving rise to the compensable event.
Thus, where a particular compensable event occurs, peer-review mech-
anisms might be triggered to make a judgment on avoidability in the
individual case for the purpose of determining whether the responsible
provider should be advised, controlled, or disciplined in some way.
Such peer oversight deterring future such events-and indeed preven-
tive oversight not occasioned by a particular occurrence-could easily
occur without any specific legal compulsion if some of the cost of each
compensable occurrence were arranged to fall directly on a provider
group which was equipped to take such action, such as a hospital medi-
cal staff.9" Thus, even if an individual physician were too obtuse to
96. Havighurst & Tancredi 137-38, 78 (discussion of MAI's "social insurance" as-
pect, which is regarded as a by-product, not an affirmative goal).
97. But see note 106 infra.
98. Several recent proposals have suggested shifting more of the malpractice risk to
the hospital as a means of providing (1) a broader base to support the compensation
obligation through premiums, which are becoming a very large expense for physicians
to bear individually, and (2) a focal point for quality assurance. Roddis & Stewart, su-
pra note 52, at 1303; Steves, supra note 4, at 1324; VIRGINIA CORPORATION COMM'N-
BuREAu OF INsURANcE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INsURANCE IN VIRGINIA: THE SCOPE AND
SEVERITY OF THE PROBLEM AND ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 79-93 (Nov. 1975). Unfortu-
nately, such a shift might also benefit providers by improving opportunities for conceal-
ing and smoothing over situations which would otherwise generate valid claims and for
presenting potential plaintiffs with a united front. Physician independence would be
threatened by an increase in hospital responsibility. See, e.g., Southwick, The Hospital
as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Relationship With the Staff
Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 429 (1973). An approach more in line with traditional
hospital-doctor relations, which hospitals, insurers, or physicians could initiate with help
from state insurance commissioners, would be for the medical staff of the hospital to
be treated as an entity for insurance rating purposes.
MAI offers maximum flexibility in allocating responsibility between doctor and hos-
pital. The initial question would be who is the "cheapest cost avoider"--to use Profes-
sor Guido Calabresi's phrase, G. CALABREsI, supra note 48, at 138-which means in this
context only that the party in the best position to take actions to minimize costs should
bear them. See notes 48, 63, 93 supra. However, the following discussion from the
original proposal suggests that roughly the same preventive measures might be taken
whichever party is selected to bear a particular risk:
We . . . would expect a risk to be assigned to one [party] or the other in
accordance with a judgment about which provider was best able to organize to
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respond to the financial incentive, or stood to profit enough to overlook
it, other forms of deterrence would also be at work and might be felt
in a strengthening of peer review in those institutions where it is now
neglected. 99
A frequently raised concern about introducing deterrence is that
it might sometimes work perversely, making matters worse rather than
better. This would occur if treatment decisions were biased inappro-
priately, perhaps leading the physician to choose a treatment mode
which, though it was less likely to result in a compensable event, was
reduce or eliminate it. Thus, for example, post-operative staph infections would
probably be [borne by the hospital] . . . , whereas the surgeon would likely
bear the primary responsibility for, say, antibiotic reactions. Although this
allocation of burdens will often seem arbitrary because responsibility is shared
to a large degree [footnote: For example, staph infections may prove to be
more resistant to preventive measures if hospital physicians have used antibi-
otics indiscreetly over time.], it may prove inconsequential from a quality point
of view because the hospital and the medical staff relate in ways which enable
them to work together to minimize adverse outcomes. Bargaining between
them would surely be initiated whichever way the responsibility was initially
assigned, and it is probable that the same preventive actions would be taken
whichever party bore the initial loss .... It is an important insight that
[liability] should create incentives not only for direct action, but also for initiat-
ing bargaining with others who are in a position to contribute to obtaining
better outcomes. [footnote omitted] Thus, continuing to hold the surgeon
responsible for the sponge count would make sense if one wished to see the
surgeon remain in control of the operating room and thought that the surgical
staff would be effective in persuading the hospital to hire better counters.
Havighurst & Tancredi 139-40, 80.
The bargaining referred to is, of course, simply "desirable, quality-oriented interaction
between hospitals and their medical staffs. The obstacles to such bargaining are not
costs so much as jealousies, which might yield to financial pressures." Id. at 140 n.6,
80 n.6.
The foregoing analysis borrows directly from that of Ronald Coase, Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 . LAW & EcoN. 1 (1960), and Guido Calabresi, CALABRESI,
supra note 48, at 150-52, 161-73, to the effect that, but for "transaction costs," assign-
ment of liability to one party or the other would not affect the quality of outcomes. The
striking insight is that "transaction costs" with respect to obtaining modifications in hos-
pital-based care are not high and that therefore most of the same injury-preventing meas-
ures are likely to be taken whoever is held technically liable. While theoretically sound
as far as it goes, this analysis leaves out the possible value of imposing potential risks
on more than one actor so as to improve chances that incentives will in fact be acted
on, Calabresi escapes this theoretical error by somewhat artificially including informa-
tion costs in "transaction costs," thus assuming away the limits of any one actor's knowl-
edge of and ability to balance risks and alternatives. Id. at 148-49. Particularly where
liability insurance limits actual financial exposure and where individual providers might
be either ignorant of hazards or willing to take small but unwarranted risks, risk-bearing
by institutions as well as individuals, as can be readily arranged under MAI, may make
especially good sense.
99. The alternative of mandating and regulating peer review efforts under PSRO or
other oversight seems unreliable since going through the motions of peer review is not
enough. See text accompanying notes 37-45 supra. Wherever it is possible, alignment
of financial incentives to coincide more closely with professional obligations offers im-
portant advantages. See note 40 supra. Cf. Havighurst & Bovbjerg, supra note 38 (on
the need for incentives to stimulate peer efforts at cost control).
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not the treatment of choice under the circumstances. 100 The obvious
solution to this problem would be to add the undesirable outcome, per-
haps even nonrecovery from the condition itself, to the list of compen-
sable events, but this would not always be feasible. 10 1 It is noteworthy,
however, that an event which might be technically unavoidable could
be justified as an addition to the list by the need to avoid biasing treat-
ment and by the observation that the technically unavoidable result
could be avoided by adopting a better mode of therapy.
Among the factors operating to prevent serious distortion of treat-
ment decisions by MAI's incentives are professional and ethical obliga-
tions to provide all needed and appropriate care, traditional peer-re-
view mechanisms, and the availability of malpractice remedies for pa-
tients who are given improper treatment. 0 Because the cost to the
individual physician of a single compensable event would not be stag-
gering and because the probability of its occurrence in a given case
would be quite small, it seems unlikely that judgments would be sig-
nificantly biased against performing professional obligations. Cer-
tainly, the distortions should be less than those introduced by the fault
system, which faces the doctor with a personal near-catastrophe if he
should ever be caught even slightly off base under the process-oriented
rules.10 3  While it is clear that incentives cannot be perfectly ordered,
it does not seem unrealistic to expect that MAI could bring them more
into line with professional responsibilities and quality-assurance
goals.' 0
4
100. It is of course possible that in some circumstances the physician would prefer
the treatment whose adverse outcome was covered under MAI, fearing the risk of a mal-
practice suit more.
101. Another way of minimizing the hazard would be to impose the costs on the hos-
pital rather than the physician, relying on the latter to look out for the patients' interests.
See note 98 supra.
102. Earlier discussion in text accompanying notes 37-45 supra does not hold these
controls to be useless, only inadequate. MAI simply adds an additional control. Those
who would rely totally on professional ethics and controls cannot deny their effective-
ness in plugging unavoidable gaps in MAI incentives.
103. An example appeared at a recent seminar: If no other blood is available, should
a nurse-anesthetist use twenty-two day old blood, i.e. blood which is one day past the
expiration date on its label? The answer from the medical-legal experts was "no," but
all agreed that under MAI it would be reasonable and good medicine to do so. N.C.
Society of Anesthesiologists, Fall Seminar, Charlotte, N.C., Nov. 15, 1975.
104. No adverse outcome of surgery was omitted from the list of compensable events
accompanying notes 71-85 supra out of fear that needed surgery would be discouraged
by inclusion of such an outcome. Neither was any attempt made to guarantee compen-
sation for the adverse consequences of not operating. Nevertheless, it is believed that
treatment decisions would not be unduly biased. For one thing, a malpractice lawsuit
could be filed for serious neglect of the surgical option. More important, there is strong
evidence that surgeons' incentives are at present excessively weighted toward performing
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A possibly worrisome example of the bias which MAI might intro-
duce is the possibility that high-risk patients might be actively avoided
by providers under an MAI system. Of course, abandonment of a
patient is itself a tort 06 and would remain so with MAI. Further,
wherever refusals to accept a high-risk patient might occur because the
patient's predisposition was apparent prior to the initiation of treat-
ment, it should be possible to define the compensable event in such
a way as to exclude those patients who present such obviously increased
risks. This course should not be adopted too quickly, however, be-
cause MAI could appropriately be designed to encourage the physician
to consider the patient's predisposition as a factor in his decision to
treat. Moreover, referral to another provider is available as an alterna-
tive means of escaping a difficult patient. Such referrals should prob-
ably be encouraged by the MAI system, since another provider may
be more competent, more specialized, or better equipped to handle the
problem. This would presumably be the case with referrals to a major
medical center, and presumably the referral physician would be in a
position to charge higher fees and therefore to face the greater risks
which difficult cases may entail. 106
Although it is difficult to be totally confident that MArs deter-
rence feature would be finely tuned to achieving quality goals, there
surgery, without adequate regard for its high costs and attendant risks. See Bunker,
Surgical Manpower: A Comparison of Operations and Surgeons in the United States
and in England and Wales, 282 Naw ENo. J. MED. 135 (1970); Lewis, Variations in the
Incidence of Surgery, 281 Nnw ENo. J. MED. 881 (1969). Making surgery's adverse
results compensable under MAI might succeed in restoring some balance to surgeons'
decisions on the need for radical measures. Again, clinicians' judgments might suggest
areas where further attention to these problems would be appropriate.
105. 1 D. LOuiSELL & H. WLLIAMS, supra note 16, f 8.02, at 192.
106. Irrespective of their competence, some providers are more likely than others to
experience particular bad outcomes because of the nature of their practice or their clien-
tele. High-risk physicians would include in particular those in teaching institutions who
treat more difficult cases, many on referral from practitioners having less specialized
skills and perhaps, under MAI, a justifiable apprehension of a compensable outcome.
MAI should not be permitted to cause such high-risk physicians' net incomes to suffer
to the point that people would be discouraged from accepting hard cases within their
competence or from practicing in such settings.
The best answer to this possible problem is that such skilled physicians can, do,
and should charge higher fees, thus not only passing the inherent risks on to the public
but also usefully rationing, through higher prices, patients' access to physicians with su-
perior skills. Because such physicians are all similarly situated, none would be at a com-
petitive disadvantage unless he was experiencing a higher-than-normal incidence of
claims for the category of patients treated. See Havighurst & Tancredi 151-52, 88-89.
Although it is important to guard against unfairness in the treatment of providers, there
does not appear to be essential unfairness here. Of course, governmental imposition of
fee schedules could create unfairness if allowances were not made for differential ex-
posure under MAI.
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is nothing inherent in the idea which foredooms it to failure, and the
flexibility of the MAI mechanism is such that most objections based
on equity and efficiency considerations can seemingly be overcome, at
least as a theoretical matter. What is needed for a preliminary assess-
ment of MAI's practical effect is, first, active participation by willing
clinicians in the specification of compensable events, and, second, a
trial of their list in the real world. Although an experiment of reason-
able scope and duration could probably not reliably reveal the effec-
tiveness of MAI in improving the quality of care, it could probably be
established that MAI would not do affirmative harm. If so, MAI might
appropriately be established even though there was no final assurance
of its capacity to improve the quality of care significantly. Since MAI
is almost certain to be an improvement over the present system in
other respects, any quality gains it might achieve in addition could be
regarded as a bonus. The added costs of financing MAI in such a way
as to preserve incentives would not be great enough to warrant sacrific-
ing the deterrence element unless it had been conclusively shown to
be ineffective.
B. MAI's Ultimate Scope
The value of MAI as a replacement for the fault system depends
in large part on its coverage. Thus, it would probably have appeal for
providers and policy makers only if a substantial proportion of the mal-
practice claims currently being filed against providers would be obvi-
ated or if the dollar costs of the fault system would be dramatically re-
duced. A judgment on this matter can be made only after a definitive
list of compensable events is established and compared to a sample of
claims.1
07
107. In an effort to appraise the extent to which an MAI scheme covering the events
listed above would obviate malpractice claims, the claims file sampled in Rudov, Myers
& Mirabella, Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims Files Closed in 1970, in MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE REPORT Appendix 1, was consulted with the assistance of the Urban Re-
search Center, University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee). Although the data available
proved too unspecific as to injury and diagnosis to allow reliable matching of specific
claims files against the list, it was estimated that sixty-one percent of the dollars paid
out in 1970 on account of claims against anesthesiologists were paid in cases involving
death or irreversible central nervous system damage to patients between one and fifty-
nine years of age undergoing nonemergency surgery and therefore seemingly falling
within one of the compensable categories established. Although these payouts disposed
of only about twenty percent of the claims against anesthesiologists which actually re-
sulted in some payment, many of the remaining claims and payments would undoubtedly
be obviated by the additional category of compensable events encompassing dental and
peripheral nerve injuries. Unfortunately, the lack of detailed information on diagnosis,
treatment, and injury made it impossible to identify new categories of events whose addi-
tion to the list would obviate additional claims.
It is obvious that MAI development requires highly detailed and readily disaggre-
1269
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
The appraisal of MAI's prospects must be done on a specialty-
by-specialty basis since its feasibility is likely to be greater in some
areas than in others. Thus, because of their definitive character and
apparent avoidability, hospital accidents, surgical mishaps, adverse con-
sequences of anesthesia, and poor results of orthopedic care lend them-
selves to delineation as compensable events; much the same reasons
account for the heavy incidence of malpractice claims for these same
injuries, which suggests in turn a reasonable prospect that MAI can al-
leviate the malpractice crisis in these hard-hit areas. On the other
-hand, the diagnostic errors in internal medicine are hard to assess with-
out a full inquiry of the kind provided in the fault system. Thus, in-
ternal medicine, fraught with uncertainty and "judgment calls,"
would be less likely to benefit from MAI; for similar reasons, internists
have been less beset by malpractice suits than have the other special-
ties.108 It thus appears that MAI will work best in precisely those
areas where it is most needed as a remedy for the malpractice situation.
Another question concerning MAI's scope and ability to solve the
malpractice-suit problem is whether the list of compensable outcomes,
in focusing on definitive, relatively avoidable events, will in fact avoid
major administrative costs. To the extent that only the "easy" malprac-
tice claims are eliminated, the cases involving high administrative costs
may still remain in the fault system, and attempts to expand the list
to cover more equivocal cases may generate litigation over the fuzzier
boundary lines.
Until sophisticated clinicians turn an open mind to these issues,
firm answers will not be forthcoming. Without careful evaluation of
MAI on its own terms, clinicians' and others' opinions on MAI's feasi-
bility may reflect only their uninformed reactions to the idea of deter-
rence and increased provider accountability.
C. Costs
Probably the main constraint on the growth of MAI to encompass
nearly all malpractice claims is the potential overall cost of the system.
gatable data on malpractice claims, including fairly precise information on (1) diagnosis,
including complications; (2) treatment; (3) injury, with specificity as to nature, serious-
ness, and damages paid, if any; (4) alleged negligence, so that claims which are not
specific to the particular procedure (e.g., failure to diagnose, failure to obtain informed
consent, foreign bodies, abandonment, and falls) can be broken out; and (5) physician
and patient characteristics. None of the data collection efforts to date has sought de-
tailed medical information of the type needed to appraise, refine, and extend MAIs im-
pact.
108. Id. at 15-16.
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Any research effort would quickly focus on the incidence of each com-
pensable event and on the total cost which MAI coverage of that event
would entail. If the greater number of payments would more than ab-
sorb the savings from lower administrative costs and from smaller
awards, MAI would appear to threaten to increase the cost of medical
care, perhaps substantially. Of course, this is deceptive, since the costs
are not new ones but are already being incurred under the present sys-
tem even though they are to a large extent left where they fall-fre-
quently on the injured patient. Also, the current incidence of the out-
comes to be made compensable under MAI is a poor indicator of po-
tential costs, since any strengthening of incentives for improved out-
comes should reduce the incidence of bad results and improve the sys-
tem's overall performance. Thus, acceptance of costs under MAI may
avoid greater costs elsewhere and produce a true social saving.10 9
The original MAI proposal discussed the possibility of providing
a limited subsidy to the MAI fund in order to keep the insurance pre-
miums manageable, perhaps near zero for providers with good experi-
ence. Indeed, the desired incentive for good provider performance
could, with a sufficient subsidy, just as appropriately take the form of
a bonus for good results as a levy for bad experience. Subsidy possi-
bilities should certainly be considered as a means of assuring that the
premium cost would not force providers to bear collectively, even as
a conduit, the entire financial burden of the many ills which MAI might
cover.
The original MAI proposal also contemplated reimbursements by
the MAI fund to collateral sources of payments for medical expenses
and wage losses. This recommendation contrasts sharply with other
proposals, which would reduce awards by the amount of such payments
received, thus effecting major dollar savings.1 0 From a social stand-
point, of course, such savings are only apparent and not real, since costs
109. On the prospective dollar costs and health benefits of classifying hepatitis fol-
lowing blood transfusions as compensable, see Itavighurst & Tancredi 154-55, 90-91.
110. E.g., Moceri & Messina, The Collateral Source Rule in Personal Injury Litiga-
tion, 7 GONZAGA L. Rlv. 310 (1972); O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance for Injuries Arising
from Medical Treatment: A Proposal for Elective Coverage, 24 EMoRY L.J. 21, 35-36
(1975); Schwartz, The Collateral-Source Rule, 41 BosTON U.L. Rlv. 348 (1961); Note,
Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HAnv. L. Rv. 741
(1964). Some observers have suggested that adoption of a national health insurance
plan would go a long way toward solving the malpractice problem. E.g., Annas, Medical
Malpractice Litigation Under National Health Insurance: Essential or Expendable?,
1975 DuKE L.J. 1335. This would indeed obviate many suits and permit reduction of




to the MAI system would be exactly offset by savings to health insurers
and other collateral sources. This fact may well be lost sight of, how-
ever, in formulating both governmental policy and policies of private
insurance."' Nevertheless, the principles of MAI almost certainly re-
quire that all the costs of covered injuries pass through its accounting
mechanism in order that incentives reflecting the system's costs will not
be distorted by the fortuitous presence or absence of collateral sources.
One way of offsetting the seemingly higher dollar costs of MAI
would be by drawing some of the suggested subsidies for the MAI fund
from the various collateral sources. These third-party payers for health
care and reimbursers of lost wages would stand to benefit from MAI
reimbursements to them as collateral sources, from the reduced inci-
dence of defensive medicine under MAI,1 2 and from the improve-
ments induced by MAI in the quality of care generally. It would seem
easy enough to offer MAI reimbursements only to those collateral
sources which paid "dues" equal to, say, eighty percent of expected
reimbursements. Larger subsidies could also be justified.
D. Prospects
The prospects for MAI are problematical. It is possible, though
the facts are still not clear, that the scope of MAI would have to be
quite broad in order for it to make a major contribution to solving the
malpractice problem.11 3  Such broad scope would in turn entail the
substantial dollar costs of socializing the consequences of many injuries
which are now borne privately, and it is quite possible that, to decision-
makers in government and the health industry, -these costs will not seem
worth incurring as an added overt cost of health care even if they rep-
resent a much better bargain for the public."1 4 Moreover, such deci-
111. See O'Connell, No-Fault Liability by Contract for Doctors, Manufacturers, Re-
tailers and Others, 632 INs. L.J 531, 532-33 (1975); O'Connell, An Elective No-Fault
Liability Statute, 628 INs. L.J 261, 264, 278 (1975).
112. MAI would encourage expenditures to improve outcomes but would obviate un-
productive expenditures now allegedly incurred by physicians concerned about malprac-
tice suits. See note 24 supra and text accompanying note 5 supra. PSROs may be able
to impose some restraint on expenditures which were not cost-justified. See notes 14,
48, 93 supra.
113. For an opinion that MAI would be too narrowly conceived to solve much of
the problem, see Note, Comparative Approaches, supra note 19, at 1153-54.
114. What is involved, of course, is a kind of compulsory insurance which, while far
better than the present kind (which devotes most of the premiums to contesting claims
on technically complex grounds unrelated to the fact of injury), would be somewhat
more expensive because of the greatly expanded coverage. Health care costs are politic-
ally visible, and anything raising them is likely to be unpopular. Although MAI would
only appear to be a new cost of health care, it would face difficulty if added expense
were entailed. Courts imposing strict liability in tort face no such constraint but lack
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sion-makers may fail to attribute any positive value to MATs quality-
assurance feature as a further benefit which might justify the appear-
ance of higher costs, preferring instead the establishment of controls
maintained by governmental or professional overseers or by a partner-
ship thereof, such as the PSRO program. Narrowness of focus, a pref-
erence for incremental as opposed to drastic change, and commitment
to political solutions are characteristic of the policy-making process, so
that even a disaster like the law of medical malpractice is more likely,
in the normal course of things, to be smoothed over than to be made
the occasion for a new departure.
For the foregoing reasons, the MAI idea would probably have lit-
tle chance even for serious study were it not for the appearance of an-
other proposal for a no-fault compensation system which bids fair to
displace the fault system, at least in part, without any legislative action
at all. Because this proposal, for what is called "elective no-fault" in-
surance, 115 relies heavily on selective specification of compensable
events in somewhat the same manner as MAI, it is likely to induce the
same kinds of evaluation and research which are required to give MAI
content and concreteness. Out of the public and private examination
of the no-fault notion which the elective no-fault idea is certain to stim-
ulate may emerge a set of realistic policy options which are different
from those now apparent, and, in this new environment, MAI may
turn out to -have a future. A comparison of "elective no-fault" and
MAI will set the stage for a concluding speculation on MAI's prospects.
V. A COMPARISON OF MAt AND "ELECTIVE NO-FAULT"
Professor Jeffrey O'Connell has proposed "elective no-fault" in-
surance as a means whereby providers of medical care can escape some
of their current malpractice burdens by voluntarily granting their pa-
tients limited "no-fault" rights in exchange for the patients' surrender
of their right to sue in tort over an outcome made compensable on a
no-fault basis. According to O'Connell, the terms of this exchange
might be either dictated by providers and made binding on patients un-
der legislation which he has proposed 1 6 or accomplished without leg-
islation by contracts entered into by providers with their patients."1
7
The purpose, much as with MAI, would be to use funds which are now
swallowed up in extravagant awards and the adjudication of fault issues
the capability to design an MAI scheme with any limits. Id. at 1157. But cf. Note,
Continuing the Common Lmv Response to the New Industrial State: The Extension of
Enterprise Liability to Consumer Services, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 401, 428 n.121 (1974).
115. See text accompanying notes 123 et seq. infra.
116. O'Connell, An Elective No-Fault Liability Statute, supra note 111.
117. O'Connell, No-Fault Liability by Contract, supra note 111.
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to pay more claimants smaller amounts automatically."18 Professor
O'Connelrs assumption is that there is enough money to be saved by
removing the necessity for fault-finding, by reducing payouts to the ex-
tent of payments from collateral sources, 119 and by denying recovery
for pain and suffering 2 ° to make such insurance an attractive alterna-
tive for both patients and providers,' 2' particularly in view of the addi-
tional relief provided from the unpleasantness, uncertainty, and delay
of malpractice lawsuits.
The elective no-fault model has great appeal. In inviting private
transactions to bypass malpractice mechanisms, 22 it obviates the need
for legislative reform and calls attention to the opportunity for achiev-
ing more far-reaching change than is likely to be wrought through legis-
latures responding to organized interest groups. The logic of private
action to squeeze out the middlemen, primarily the lawyers, is power-
ful, and it is reasonable to expect that the potential gains will induce
action on this front.
A. Deterrence Under Elective No-Fault
Although the O'Connell scheme may represent a modest begin-
ning toward a kind of MAI, it is not explicit on the matter of incen-
118. O'Connell, supra note 110, at 35. The premise is the same as under automobile
no-fault-namely that no more and probably less cost will be experienced than under
the fault system.
119. Id. See notes 110-11 supra and accompanying text.
120. Id. at 34-35. See Havighurst & Tancredi 128-29, 72 (proposing limited pain and
suffering awards).
121. It is possible that O'Connell exaggerates the cost savings which his system would
yield: (1) Patients with steady or higher incomes would be more likely to have protec-
tion from collateral sources, which would reduce their entitlements under the no-fault
plan; they would therefore refuse the option tendered, preserving the hazard of large
awards based on wage loss. (2) The no-fault policy is more likely to cover outcomes
reflecting obvious and easily provable negligence than to cover more questionable out-
comes, see note 130 infra, which are precisely the ones which occasion most of the major
administrative expenses which O'Connell hopes to save. (3) A trade-off clearly exists
between the liberality of the no-fault scheme and prospective claimants' propensity to
litigate to escape its coverage and qualify for a tort remedy; O'Connell's scheme, by
allowing only actual out-of-pocket losses, would induce many skirmishes at the border-
lines, unless compensable events were very sharply defined. Of course, a more liberal
plan might increase insurer and provider resistance to payment, but this could be dealt
with by requiring the insurer to bear the successful claimant's costs of litigating cover-
age questions. See Havighurst & Tancredi 132, 74.
122. Dean Richard Rosett of the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business
supports a variant of the O'Connell plan, suggesting that a physician might offer his pa-
tients a choice between the present system and a no-fault alternative at a higher or lower
price. Rosett, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis, Medical Malpractice Crisis
Conference (U. of Md. Law School, Nov. 21-22, 1975). The implied belief that doctors
would actively seek to accommodate their patients seems unduly optimistic for reasons
stated in notes 127 & 130 infra.
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tives, 28 and the insurance contemplated might well not feature the ex-
perience rating or cost-sharing arrangements contemplated in the MAI
model. Conceivably, insurers would find it in their interest to adopt
experience rating or to include provider cost-sharing provisions in their
policies, but this cannot be counted upon in a heavily regulated, indif-
ferently competitive market. 2 4  Although providers with better ex-
perience might press for price concessions, the organized medical inter-
ests which would be engaged in developing the no-fault policy' 25 would
strongly prefer that costs be shared in a way facilitating their automatic
pass-through to patients. Moreover, it is not likely that patients, in
contracting privately, would attach particular value to designing an in-
surance arrangement which preserves providers' quality-inducing in-
centives. 26  Finally, if the insurance was designed without specific at-
tention to the avoidability of the covered injuries, incentive pricing of it
would seem more unreasonable than under MAI.
For the foregoing reasons, introduction of elective no-fault could
easily cost society its only opportunity for designing a deterrence fea-
ture into the new system for compensating for medical injuries. This
result is not inevitable, however, and insurance regulation could well
stimulate attention to the design and pricing of elective no-fault in-
surance which would achieve many of the goals of MAI.
B. Compensable Events Under Elective No-Fault
Although the O'Connell plan involves specifying compensable
events in much the same manner as MAI, the list of medical outcomes
compensable under it would be shorter than under an MAI scheme de-
veloped by administrative means pursuant to a statutory mandate. Pro-
viders responding to O'Connell's call would have no reason voluntarily
123. Professor O'Connell himself has attached no importance to this aspect, though
he would probably not oppose the introduction of an incentive feature. His view of the
malpractice problem is similar to his view of automobile no-fault, however, where incen-
tives seemed much less likely to work. For a guide to O'Connell's general orientation,
see J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, NO-FAULT AND BEYOND (1975), which
devotes only limited coverage to deterrence possibilities. E.g., id. at 624-28.
124. See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
125. See note 127 infra.
126. Although patients might be well advised to insist that incentive features be pre-
served, their ignorance and traditional trust of physicians would probably result in their
acceptance of the insurance protection offered without regard to how it was financed
and what it did to provider incentives. In these circumstances it would not be incorrect
to characterize quality assurance as an external benefit potentially flowing from the MAI
model-that is, as a public good which the contracting private parties themselves have
no incentive or opportunity to realize in structuring a program of no-fault benefits to




to purchase coverage for avoidable outcomes which, though unfavor-
able from the patient's point of view, become the subject of malpractice
claims in only a small percentage of cases-possibly because any negli-
gence contributing to them is difficult to discover or to prove. 2 7 Thus,
elective no-fault, having its baseline in the existing system and being
designed by providers primarily for their own benefit, would be viable
only to the extent that physicians perceived a benefit to themselves,
in terms of cost and avoidance of unpleasantness, in establishing com-
pensable categories.
Although Professor O'Connell has yet to be specific about the
coverage contemplated, he has observed the necessity for broadening
the class of compensable events somewhat beyond those readily cov-
ered in the fault system in order that some mutuality of benefit be-
tween patients and doctors appear when the inevitable legal ques-
tions are raised concerning either the constitutionality of any legisla-
tion 28 or the enforceability of the contracts employed. 29 It is indeed
probable that patients must appear to receive a reasonable quid pro
quo if legal challenges to elective no-fault are to be resisted, but pro-
vider dictation of the terms of an exchange would still produce a
greater reduction in patients' malpractice rights and a smaller expan-
sion of their no-fault rights than would a bargaining process in which
consumers participated with equal bargaining power and capacity.'3 0
127. Professor O'Connell contemplates that providers and insurers will jointly design
the insurance coverage. Although at some points, e.g., O'Connell, No-Fault Liability
by Contract, supra note 111, at 532-33; O'Connell, An Elective No-Fault Liability Stat-
ute, supra note 111, at 264-66, 270-71, he appears to suggest that individual providers
could design the coverage they wished to offer (suggesting that competition among pro-
viders to offer consumers the most attractive combinations of rights might ensue), this
is manifestly impossible given the exigencies of insurance, which require uniform con-
tracts and large groups for rating purposes. The more likely scenario, which O'Connell
probably also visualizes, is the development of uniform insurance contracts by specialty
societies, to be offered to patients on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The probability that
such contracts of adhesion will be employed is strengthened by the understandable re-
luctance of providers to haggle with patients over matters raising the spectre of untoward
events which might occur in the process of treatment.
128. J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSuLT TO INJURY 204-31 (1975); O'Connell, An Elec-
tive No-Fault Liability Statute, supra note 111, at 262-63.
129. O'Connell, No-Fault Liability by Contract, supra note 111, at 540-42; O'Con-
nell, An Elective No-Fault Liability Statute, supra note 111, at 204-3 1.
130. Possible additions to the list of compensable events fall into three categories:
(1) those additions which would benefit doctors and hurt patients (e.g., an outcome
now readily discovered and almost automatically compensable with an allowance for
pain and suffering, which under MAI would be compensated at a lower rate without sig-
nificant administrative savings); (2) those additions which would benefit both doctor
and patient (e.g., an outcome now occasioning enough administrative costs that all
events could be compensated at a cost hardly greater than the old system entailed); and
(3) those additions which would benefit patients only (e.g., an outcome previously com-
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Legal doctrines designed to prevent unconscionable contracts, while
perhaps effective in preventing provider overreaching which makes
consumers worse off than they are at present, are unlikely to help pa-
tients receive all of the benefits to which they might be deemed enti-
tled. Two serious issues with "elective no-fault" thus emerge: (1)
whether the fault system should be displaced only to the extent that
it suits providers to displace it and (2) whether the possibly substantial
benefits to be derived from partially displacing the fault system should
accrue only to providers or should be allocated more equitably between
providers and patients.
C. How MAI Legislation Could Improve Upon Elective No-Fault
The problems with elective no-fault could be overcome by legisla-
tion doing more than simply authorizing providers to adopt, and either
offer to or impose on patients, a no-fault plan of their own devising.
Such legislation would be more than a simple enabling act blessing pri-
vate no-fault arrangements, and would establish many of the plan's de-
tails while leaving delineation of compensable events to an administra-
tive mechanism. Of course, this administrative process might yield re-
sults no different than those under provider-designed elective no-fault
if the mechanism were itself dominated by providers, but specific pro-
vision would undoubtedly be made for obtaining knowledgeable rep-
resentation of consumer interests. 31 An exchange of malpractice and
no-fault rights between providers and patients would be more likely
to produce an equitable outcome if it took place through a political bar-
gaining process than if its terms were dictated by providers.' 32  Also,
pensated so rarely that significantly increased costs would result under elective no-fault).
Physicians would undoubtedly be glad to accept no-fault liability for items in categories
(1) and (2) but would not add items in category (3) unless they were convinced it was
necessary to do so to overcome legal challenges. See text accompanying notes 128-29
supra. Whether they would actually be harmed by further additions is not clear since
patients might willingly pay higher fees for the increased protection. Nevertheless, there
are many reasons-fee schedules inhibiting fee increases, the risk of government dis-
pleasure, reluctance to enter the business of selling a kind of insurance and explaining
the hazards it protects against, and so forth-why providers would seek to avoid in-
curring increased costs and would offer only no-fault coverage designed for their own
benefit. Medical traditions being what they are-seriously anticompetitive-, competi-
tion would be unlikely to stimulate a range of choice even if the exigencies of the insur-
ance business did not largely preclude experimentation and product differentiation. In-
stead, organized professional groups, in designing the coverage, will take account of their
members' interests alone.
131. The original MAI proposal seemed to promise more professional influence in
delineating compensable events than now seems appropriate. See Havighurst & Tancredi
163-64, 97.
132. See note 130 supra.
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the prospects for subsequently expanding the list to achieve new qual-
ity-assurance objectives would be substantially enhanced.
Reliance on the administrative process to develop the MAI op-
tion would also allow careful attention to all the problems of introduc-
ing appropriate incentive features. A statutory mandate to pursue de-
terrence would stimulate the needed attention to this aspect of the
no-fault concept, but if the agency found, on the basis of controlled
studies and other evidence, that the deterrence goal was chimerical,
it could lay that aspect to rest and still maintain a no-fault scheme for
the sake of its value as a less costly alternative to the fault system.
Moreover, with the proper mandate, the agency could also elect to
pursue quality objectives by administrative means, perhaps by flagging
compensable outcomes for peer investigation to detect specific quality
failures warranting remedial action. It thus seems clear that the no-
fault model could be established legislatively without positive evidence
that MArs incentive feature would improve the quality of care at a rea-
sonable cost. All that is required is a legislative mandate to an admin-
istrative agency to develop and make available a no-fault option, to de-
sign into the scheme such incentive features as it found workable, and
to adopt other quality-assurance mechanisms where deterrence features
proved either wholly unworkable or inadequate in and of themselves
to achieve quality goals.
Although MAI should certainly have an elective feature of its
own,133 it should not, in contrast to the O'Connell proposal, be neutral
133. Presumably providers would opt in or out, and their decisions would bind their
patients. This is the approach of the Kennedy-Inouye bill, S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975), and it would allow consumers to express their preferences through their choice
of provider rather than in negotiations, as Dean Rosett contemplates. See note 122
supra.
If an MAI plan with reliable quality-assurance incentives were ultimately adopted,
certain special inducements for provider participation, in addition to curtailment of their
exposure to fault-based liability, might be deemed appropriate. For example, the follow-
ing measures beneficial to providers participating under MAI might be helpful not only
as a stimulus to MAI participation but also as steps in the direction of a policy of pri-
mary reliance on outcomes measures of quality rather than on expensive process con-
trols and restrictive input specifications: (1) A provider electing MAI could be given
some relief from licensure restrictions on the use of nonphysician manpower. See U.S.
DEP'T oF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, DEvELM mENTs iN HEALTH MANPOWER
LicENSuRE 47-49 (DHEW Pub. No. (HRA) 74-3101) (June 1973); U.S. DEP'T oF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REPORT ON LICENSURE AND RELATED HEALTH PERSON-
NEL CREDENTALiNG 65-70 (DHEW Pub. No. (HSM) 72-11) (June 1971). (2) Physi-
cian relicensure and continuing education requirements might be applied only to nonpar-
ticipants in MAI. But cf. S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (looks the other way,
imposing such requirements only on participants in a no-fault scheme lacking quality-
assurance incentive). (3) Physicians and hospitals subscribing to MAI could be ex-
empted in whole or in part from quality regulation by PSROs, and health maintenance
1278 [Vol. 1975:1233
Vol. 1975:12331 MEDICAL ADVERSITY INSURANCE
on quality issues, and, if at all possible, it should represent, in contrast
to the Kennedy-Inouye bill, a new departure in quality assurance away
from costly and unproven governmental controls. Its coverage and at-
tractiveness to providers should not be governed solely by the scope
and severity of the malpractice threat as perceived by individual pro-
viders but should instead be dictated in substantial part by affirmative
quality concerns and attention to patients' interests. The fault system's
defects should not be allowed to infect MAI-to rule it "from the
grave," as it were3--or to limit its ability to perform a reasonably
comprehensive quality-assurance function in areas entrusted to its care.
Despite the foregoing reservations about elective no-fault, which
suggest that it would fall short of achieving all that the original MAI
proposal held possible, the O'Connell proposal has great force as well
as the great advantages of being non-legislative and somewhat incre-
mental in its impact and of bypassing numerous obstacles to adoption
of the no-fault concept. Although its widespread adoption might fore-
close later attempts to reintroduce incentive features, for the immedi-
ate future the tasks involved in developing the O'Connell plan-
namely delineating compensable events and testing their impact on
malpractice claims and costs-are very much in keeping with advanc-
ing the MAI proposal. There is every reason to believe that elective
no-fault will be attractive enough to stimulate prompt investment in
such research and that some study of MAI will be included in that ef-
fort. The outcome should be a much more solid basis for considering
the merits of both proposals.
CONCLUSION
If present legislative endeavors do not reduce the malpractice-suit
organizations under MAI could be relieved of PSRO oversight. See Havighurst &
Bovbjerg, supra note 38; Bovbjerg, supra note 16. But see notes 48 & 93 supra. (4)
Hospitals under MAI could be allowed to qualify automatically (or at least more easily)
for state licensure, participation under Medicare, and JCAH accreditation. (5) MAI
participation could be made more attractive by not cutting back too arbitrarily on plain-
tiffs' rights under traditional principles.
MAI might prove popular with providers for other reasons besides the foregoing
special inducements. Because MAI might be designed, as in the original model, Havig-
hurst & Tancredi 139-40, 79-80, to shift to the hospital certain risks normally borne by
the physician, he would escape these risks altogether by participating; by the same
token, his exposure as a joint tort feasor would be increased if other participants' liability
was limited under MAI and his was not. Moreover, a subsidy to the MAI fund, see
text at 109 supra, could improve the comparative cost picture substantially. Finally, if
the program was properly designed, patients would probably be attracted to it since it
would improve their protection overall, and doctors would therefore have some incentive
to offer it as an accommodation to their patients.
134. See Blum & Kalven, Ceilings, Costs, and Compulsion in Auto Compensation
Legislation, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 341, 376.
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problem to manageable proportions, pressure for a no-fault compensa-
tion system for medical accidents will continue to grow.'35 The cost of
compensating patients for all iatrogenic injuries could well be prohibi-
tive, however, even if it were limited to reimbursing only out-of-pocket
costs, if national health insurance absorbed most of the medical ex-
penses, and if the administrative costs about which Professor Keeton
has warned were reduced by a substantial deductible. There might
therefore be a strong temptation to adopt no-fault insurance on a more
selective basis, using the technique, employed under both MAI and
Professor O'Connell's elective no-fault scheme, of specifying a limited
set of compensable events in advance. Once the principle of selectivity
was adopted, it seems probable that emphasis would be placed on pro-
viding compensation in those categories of cases which are most likely
to generate malpractice claims-that is, those in which the regrettable
outcome is most frequently avoidable. Because the impetus for the
entire effort would be to substitute no-fault rights for common-law
rights, the list of compensable events would surely appear to the lay-
man to represent a catalog of the system's failures, and it is at least
questionable whether the public would be willing to pick up such an
itemized bill. In these circumstances, it seems likely that pressure
would emerge for preserving some accountability for these costs on the
part of those providers whose patients suffer the compensable adverse
results. This scenario of course calls for MAI then to enter in shining
armor, to slay the malpractice dragon, and to establish in the land a
regime based on reason, provider accountability, and compassion for
the victims of medical accidents.
Properly understood, MA is not a radical measure, and it does
indeed hold out a hope for avoiding much contentiousness and cost,
which are currently by-products of malpractice litigation and which
would also attend an effective regulatory scheme designed to make
providers accountable by regulatory means and to alter the behavior
of a significant number of them in material respects. In these circum-
stances, it is reasonable to expect the health care system to devote some
resources and thoughtful consideration to converting MAI's promising
theory into practical reality. Only a limited amount of study would be
necessary to qualify MA for adoption by a forward-looking state legis-
lature, with a direction to an administrative agency to establish the
scheme in such a way as to seek a major reduction of both malpractice
claims and, through deterrence, medical injuries.
135. E.g., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVIsoRY PANEL ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE,
STATE OF NEW YORK 53-63 (Jan. 1976).
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